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ABSTRACT

Title of Dissertation: The implementation of port state control under the Maritime Labour
Convention, 2006

Degree:

MSc

This dissertation aims to examine the difference of legal grounds in relation to Port State
Control (PSC) between the Conventions under the auspice of IMO and ILO and investigate
the influence of the Maritime Labour Convention, 2006 (MLC) on the shipping industry. This
dissertation focuses on finding out the weaknesses of seafarers’ living and working
environments under the MLC and ILO No. 147 Convention related to the PSC data
conducted by the Paris MoU and the Tokyo MOU during a three-year interval before and
after 2013, which was the year entered into force the MLC.
This study pinpoints that, although the “innovative measures” of the MLC with respect to
the ILO Conventions provide the right of port states to inspect foreign vessels in their ports,
the “flexibility” of the MLC granting national discretions could lead into reluctant PSC
inspections since the national requirements are contradictory to the principle of the
inspection based on internationally agreed rules.
The analysis compares the data of both MOUs through the relationship with ship type, age,
gross tonnage, deficiency and detention for two periods and reveals that the deficiencies of
the Tokyo MOU increased by 71.8 percent in three years after 2013 compared to those of
before 2013, while the ones of the Paris MoU slightly decreased during that period. However,
the number of detentions increased in both MOUs. The analysis also shows that the MLC,
supported by the “police power” of PSC, would bring a positive effect to the improvement of
seafarers’ living and working conditions, which will consequently contribute to the safety of
ships and shipping.

KEYWORDS: Port State Control (PSC), Maritime Labour Convention (MLC), ILO No. 147
Convention, Paris MoU, Tokyo MOU
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INTRODUCTION
1.1 Background

It is a traditional and well recognized principle of international maritime law that the State
whose flag the ship flies has the jurisdiction of enforcement regime over that ship. It is clearly
stated in Article 94 of the United Nations Convention on the Laws of the Sea, 1982
(UNCLOS) that a flag state shall effectively exercise its jurisdiction and control in
administrative, technical and social matters over its ships.
In an effort to deal with the continuing problem of ships loss, the British parliament
adopted the Loadline requirements in 1906, which was officially applied to all ships including
foreign vessels visiting British ports and triggered the interventionism at the national level to
other major maritime nations (Boisson, 1999). However, like the history of making new
maritime conventions and regulations, things were significantly changed after the tragic
accident of Titanic in 1912. The International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea
(SOLAS), 1914, which was the first regulatory international convention in the maritime safety
domain, initially enacted the legal ground for the control of foreign vessels by a port state.
Since that legal instrument did not enter into force because of the World War I, the first
effective instrument on port state’s right to control foreign vessels calling in its ports is
associated with the SOLAS 1929 (IMO, 2011; Ozcayir, 2004).
The Torrey Canyon accident off the western coast of Cornwall, the United Kingdom, in
1969, paved the way for coastal states towards acquiring the right to intervene with foreign
ships in their ports or outside their territorial water actively to prevent damage caused by the
ships’ failures. This trend led to strengthen port states’ power under Article 6 of the
International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships 1973, as modified by the
Protocol of 1978 relating to thereto (MARPOL) and Articles 218 and 219 of the UNCLOS.
However, the right of the port state under these Articles relates only about the protection of
the marine environment aspects and is interpreted not to have direct grounds of inspecting
on safety issues (Boisson, 1999; Ehlers, 2017). This drawback of the UNCLOS on Port State
Control (PSC) of safety matters might be complimented by the SOLAS 1974.
Meanwhile, to tackle the issue of substandard vessels effectively, the idea of cooperating
among neighboring countries or at the regional level on PSC inspection was put forward.
Thus, PSC has emerged as a safety net for counteracting the misconduct and negligence of
flag states and classification societies, which have the primary responsibility on ship’s safety.
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The origin of regional PSC regime was the Memorandum of Understanding among eight
North Sea States1 signed in the Hague (Hague MOU) in 1978, which had the aim to
cooperate with PSC inspections on the Merchant Shipping (Minimum Standards) Convention,
1976 (ILO No. 147 Convention) (Ozcayir, 2004). A high public press in Western Europe
society caused by the massive oil spill of Amoco Cadiz in March 1978 pushed stricter
surveillance of port states over foreign vessels and, consequently, expanded its members
and inspection areas leading to establish the Paris Memorandum of Understanding on Port
State Control (Paris MoU) in 1982 by 14 European countries2 (Ozcayir, 2004; Paris MoU,
2016a).
Noting that there are limitations of flag state’s enforcement related to the shipping
industry’s nature and that a regional PSC MOU is an adequate safety net to control
substandard ships, the International Maritime Organization (IMO) encouraged establishing a
regional PSC MOU and cooperating among member authorities and between MOUs.
It is also necessary to consider the Maritime Labor Convention (MLC), which was
adopted in 2006 and took effect on the twentieth August 2013 under the auspices of the
International Labour Organization (ILO) in cooperation with the IMO. The MLC, as a “bill of
rights” for seafarers, became the “fourth pillar” in the maritime sector with the traditional parts
of safety, environment protection and seafarers training and certification represented by the
SOLAS, MARPOL and the International Convention on Standards of Training, Certification
and Watchkeeping for Seafarers 1978 (STCW) respectively (Baldauf, Dalaklis, & Kataria,
2016; Durler, 2010; Lavelle, 2014).
While the MLC is expected to lead towards “the universality of application and the level
playing field” for the shipping industry mainly through PSC inspection of no more favourable
treatment, this Convention describes a level of “flexibility”, to allow its member states to
exercise their discretion by legislating international regulations into their national laws and
regulations (McConnell, Devlin, & Doumbia-Henry, 2011). For instance, the definition of
“night” work and the “types of jeopardizing work” for seafarers under the age of 18 according
to Standard A1.1 shall be defined or determined by national laws or regulations. While this
discretion would lead its member states to lessen the burden of implementation and to adopt
it speedily, it would act as an adverse effect to conduct PSC inspections because PSC
officers do not deeply know the national rules concerned and have difficulties to correctly
interpret them within the limited inspection time.

Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany (Federal Republic of), the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden and
the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
1
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Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway,
Portugal, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
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Additionally, there are not many studies about how to evaluate the effect of the
Convention and what areas the Convention has regarding the weaknesses in respect of its
implementation. Considering that the PSC inspection data is a reliable source, as one of the
most accurate and objective indicators among several related data available, to appraise the
performance of international maritime conventions, it is worthy at the time of three years
after the effectuation of the MLC to evaluate its effect through the analysis on the PSC data.
1.2 Objectives of the study
The analysis in hand will investigate the difference of legal aspects between the IMO and
ILO Conventions on seafarers and broadly discuss the impacts of the MLC on the shipping
industry and seafarers’ working environment. Additionally, it will study the outcome of the
PSC inspections between the MLC and the ILO No. 147 Convention, which is another labour
convention effective before the effectuation of the MLC.
The analysis in hand will also examine the flexibility of flag states’ discretion in the
regulations of the MLC, which may cause disagreements among PSC officers or even
between a Flag state and a Port state, or reluctance in conducting PSC inspection. This
research will examine the effect of the MLC on the seafarers’ working environment based on
analyzing the PSC inspection data, mainly in relation to the Paris MoU and the
Memorandum of Understanding on Port State Control in the Asia-Pacific region (Tokyo
MOU), on the ground of these questions.
Based on the results, it will try to identify the drawbacks of the MLC in implementing PSC
as well as the associated weak areas. The study will seek further improvements to address
the limitations on the MLC regulations. It is hoped thereby that this study will help the
shipping industry and competent authorities to implement the Convention with the wider
understanding on the weak parts of implementing the MLC in terms of the PSC and take
corrective actions thereto.
1.3 Scope of the study
The research will examine the right of port states empowered by the ILO Conventions on
seafarers, which contain different requirements; it will also carry out analysis for the PSC
inspection data on seafarers’ living and working conditions collected by the Tokyo MOU
and the Paris MoU. The data will analyze and compare each area by the ship’s age, type,
gross tonnage, nature of deficiency and detention for two groups of 3 years before and after
2013, which is the MLC effectuated, between the records of the two regional PSC regimes.
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The research will identify the difference of deficiencies pointed out by port authorities of
both MOUs between the ILO No. 147 Convention and the MLC, as well as the weak part of
the MLC in terms of PSC inspection.
1.4 Literature review
Titz (1989) supported that PSC is an effective tool in protecting environmental pollution
via an analysis of 4.5 years’ PSC inspection data at the very beginning of the Paris MoU.
The analysis showed that as a ship gets older the deficiencies related to environmental
matters are increasing and that PSC works as a tool to detect a potential polluter.
Stewart (1990) elaborated on the background of PSC and, especially, the structure and
inspection procedure of the Paris MoU and the United States Coast Guard (USCG). The
author examined the legal aspect of PSC that relates to Flag States, mostly open registry,
which do not have enough administrative power to monitor and control their fleet whether
they comply with international and national regulations or not. Another legal issue raised by
the author was the civil liability of a shipowner or carrier and the liability of the Port State for
loss of a carrier as a result of unduly detention.
Bo (2006) examined various articles of the MLC and the obligation of contraction
governments, including a port state. He researched to identify which area should be
improved to obtain the objective of the Convention in terms of the national level of China.
Mejia (2005) reviewed the performances criteria for the International Safety Management
Code (ISM Code) by the analysis of PSC data, inspected by the Swedish Maritime
Administration, comparing the deficiencies rate and detentions rate of different ship types
between two periods; the first phase for pre-implementing the ISM Code and the second
phase for post-implementing ISM Code. Although there were no significant trends, the
author provided the observation that the analysis of PSC data suggested that the ISM Code
gave positive impact on a ship’s safety.
Veganaden (2007) examined the influences to the working conditions of seafarers by
the implementation of MLC at the point of flag states, shipowners and ship crews. The
author demonstrated that the compliance of the Convention greatly depended on the PSC
and emphasized the harmonization and cooperation approach at the regional MOU level to
tackle substandard vessels that were not complying with the Convention.
Jeon (2016) studied the missing or inadequate clauses of Korean national law compared
to those of MLC in respect to the implementation of PSC. The author pointed out the
limitation of PSC officers when dealing with some issues of Article III of MLC regarding the
freedom of association, right of collective bargaining and elimination of all forms of forced or
compulsory labour, which had not expressly stipulated their definition, application and
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enforcement into the regulations or Code. He suggested that the national law would be
supplemented for the detailed PSC inspection procedure and onshore complaint handling
procedures.
Lee (2016) examined the effectiveness of the ISM Code by analyzing PSC deficiencies
of the Tokyo MOU and non-conformities of the ISM audit for Korean vessels. It observed
that the PSC influenced more effectively to improve some limited parts like emergency
preparedness, maintenance and documentation in a short period while ISM worked in the
long term to improve a ship’s safety management system. The author stressed that the
“police power” of PSC with the cooperation of regional authorities provided a string motive
for shipping companies and seafarers to maintain their vessels in good condition at all
times to prevent a detention by a port state.
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PORT STATE CONTROL

2.1

The legal grounds of PSC

Legal foundation in SOLAS
The primary responsibility of a ship’s safety belongs to the shipowners and the flag state
who should take proper measures to ensure that ships flying its flag comply with generally
agreed international standards on ship’s equipment, structure, manning and crew
competence according to Article 94 of UNCLOS. In practice, many flag states entrust their
authority to a Recognized Organization (RO) for inspections and issuing certificates to their
fleet according to the relevant rules including Regulation 6 and 12 of Chapter I of SOLAS
and Regulation 6 and 7.2 of Annex I of MARPOL. However, the overall responsibility of the
certificates issued by ROs still remains within the Administration of the flag state.
It is not a simple event for a port state or coastal state to inspect or investigate foreign
vessels in their territory, since a vessel has been considered by international customary
laws as a “moving territory” of the flag state that the ship is registered. Because of
increasing international trading and calls of foreign ships in their ports and coastal waters,
the need for coastal and port states to control the foreign vessels was created. The first
outcome of these trends was Article 61 of the SOLAS 1914 that states:

Every ship holding a Safety Certificate issued by the officers of the Contracting State to
which it belongs, or by persons duly authorised by that State, is subject in the ports of
the other Contracting States to control by officers duly authorized by their
Governments in so far as this control is directed towards verifying that there is on
board a valid Safety Certificate, and, if necessary, that the conditions of the vessel’s
seaworthiness correspond substantially with the particulars of that certificates ; that is
to say, so that the ship can proceed to sea without danger to the passengers and the
crew. (Boisson, 1999)
It is evaluated as a “pioneering approach” to the legal aspect of allowing port states’
intervention to the territorial power of a flag state that dominated at that time, considering
the clauses having a similar effect came to appear in MARPOL and STCW in 1970s. Even
though the Convention was not introduced because of the outbreak of World War I, its
intention was succeeded by the Article 54 of the SOLAS 1929, which became effective in
1933. The Article had similar expressions to its predecessor, only adding by the following
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sentence: ”In the event of this control giving rise to intervention if any kind, the officer
carrying out the control shall forthwith inform the Consul of the country in which the ship is
deemed to be necessary.” This article was incorporated into regulation 19 of Chapter I of
SOLAS 1974 through SOLAS 1948 and SOLAS 1960.
Additionally, Regulation 4 of Chapter 11-1 of SOLAS describes the PSC operational
requirements. The PSC officers may ask for demonstrations and evaluate ship crew’s
familiarizations on essential procedures on board such as firefighting and lifeboat launching
under the regulations. Furthermore, Regulation 6.2 of Chapter IX and Regulation 9 of
Chapter 11-2 of SOLAS on PSC significantly contribute to better quality levels of a ship’s
safety and security.

Legal grounds in MARPOL
Owing to the global industrialization after the Second World War, the growth of seaborne
trade from the 1950s drastically increased during the next 50 years with an average annual
growth rate of about five percent compared to only nearly two percent annual growth rate
for the previous 50 years since 1900 (Ma, 2016). This trend attracted many new ships into
the shipping industry, but unfortunately a substantial number of accidents was also
recorded. The world merchant fleet multiplied 2.63 times during 15 years: from 82.7 million
gross tonnages in 1955 to 217.9 million gross tonnages in 1970. Remarkably, oil tankers
expanded their gross tonnage by about 3.25 times during the period (UNCTAD, 1971).
To prevent ship-based pollution, the International Convention for the Prevention of
Pollution of the Sea by Oil, 1954 (OILPOL) was adopted and entered into force in 1958.
Although the Convention regulated the discharge of oil or oily mixtures from machinery
spaces or cargo tank, the Convention had no clauses of inspection and certification by a
flag state. The power of a port state in their territory under this convention is only inspecting
the respective oil record book according to its Article IX.
Serious marine accidents were associated with the expansion of the world merchant fleet
and open registries of providing more economic and administrative benefits to shipowners
(Mukherjee, Brownrigg, Xu, & Mejia, 2013). Especially, a series of pollution incidents
occurred in European and the United States waters by Liberian oil tankers, such as the
Torrey Canyon in 1967, Ocean Eagle in 1968, Argo Merchant in 1976 and Amoco Cadiz in
1978, which promoted the notion of enforcing stricter PSCs and strengthening the port
state’s power. Further, OILPOL, despite of the amendments in 1962, 1969 and 1971,
largely allowed discharging ballast water contaminated in cargo tanks and proved
inadequate to protect the marine environment (Boisson, 1999; Kasoulides, 1993; IMO,
n.d.a).
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Another drawback of OILPOL compared to its successor or SOLAS 1948, which was a
contemporary convention on ship safety area, is that the Convention provided the legal
grounds only for a flag state intervention, not for port states. To remedy the legal
shortcomings of OILPOL and to strengthen the flag states’ responsibility and port states’
jurisdiction, IMO adopted the MARPOL Convention in 1973. This Convention introduced the
“survey and certification system” by a flag state for ship’s equipment and structure including
oil filtering system and segregated ballast tank that is independent from cargo tank. Articles
5(2) and 6(2) of the Convention also empowered port states of its contracting parties to
exercise the right of inspection to a ship calling at their ports or terminals. The Convention
was modified by the Protocol in 1978, so called MARPOL 73/78, which became effective in
1983.
The MARPOL Convention consists of independent Annexes that regulate different
polluters of oil, noxious liquid substances, harmful substances, sewages, garbage and air
pollutants. Therefore, each Annex has the grounds of PSC on operational requirement
under Regulation 11 of Annex I, Regulation 16.9 of Annex II, Regulation 9 of Annex III,
Regulation 14 of Annex IV, Regulation 9 of Annex V and Regulation 10 of Annex VI.
Legal grounds in the Load line Convention
Despite some measures such as the recommendation of limiting loading cargoes by the
Lloyds Register in 1835, many accidents still happened until the middle of the 19th century
in the world. For instance, there were 1,313 shipwrecks in 1867. The first rule setting
minimum freeboard for merchant vessels was recorded via the British Merchant Shipping
Act of 1876 (Boisson, 1999; Ventura, n.d).
The first International Convention on Load Lines (ICLL) was adopted in 1930 in order to,
as stated in its Preamble, “promote of life and property at sea by establishing in common
agreement uniform principles and rules”. The Convention aims to secure minimum reserve
buoyance for safeguard by limiting maximum quantity of cargoes on board (Boisson, 1999).
The limitations, the so called Plimsoll mark, are indicated amidships on both side hulls with
seasonal and maritime regional freeboards.
Ships engaged in international voyages are required to hold a relevant certificate after
the survey of their flag states and subject to control by the port state according to Article 16
of the Convention. This convention was succeeded by ICLL 1966, which entered into force
in 1968; the right of PSC is affirmed by Article 21 of the new Convention.

Legal grounds in the Tonnage Measurement Convention
The International Convention on Tonnage Measurement of Ships (Tonnage Convention)
was adopted in 1969 to unify a diverse tonnage measurement system of each state for
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merchant ships and entered into force in 1982. Although the Tonnage Convention itself
does not deal with safety or environmental issues, Article 12 of the Convention provides the
reference of PSC as the Convention is important for PSC activities. The Convention defines
a ship’s gross tonnage that is the criteria whether or not the ship applies to the specific
regulations of SOLAS, MARPOL and STCW.

Legal grounds in STCW Convention
To achieve the minimum competency of seafarers and unify different standards on
certification, training and education for seafarers by each state, IMO adopted the STCW
Convention in 1978, which entered into force in 1984. According to Article X of the
Convention, PSC officers are given the right to verify that seafarers on board hold the
relevant Certificates of Competency or Endorsement and other certificates for basic training,
familiarization training and special training for certain types of ship and equipment on board.
On the other hand, the 1995 amendment to the STCW Convention contained distinctive
requirements to impose more obligations on flag states compared to other Conventions
under the auspices of IMO. A flag state is required to conduct an evaluation by an outside
organization for its quality standards on their certification system, training courses,
programs, examination and qualification of instructors and assessors at intervals of not
more than five years according to Regulation I/8.
Another requirement for flag states is to provide to IMO detailed information on its
administrative measures, including the evaluation of quality standards, on how to assure its
national system to fulfill the conventional requirements full and complete effect according to
Regulation I/7. After reviewing the information of flag states by panels of competent
persons, IMO produces a list of “confirmed parties”, the so called “white list”, which
complies the Convention (Boisson, 1999; IMO, n.d.b).
Legal grounds in UNCLOS
The UNCLOS, as “a constitution for the oceans”, was adopted at the third United Nations
Conference on the Law of the Sea (third Conference) in 1982 after nearly a 20-year long
discussion. UNCLOS takes into account all the legal aspects of the ocean space over
serious conflicts between two opposing fundamental principles, i.e. territorial sovereignty
and freedom of the seas (Bernaerts, 1988). The Convention incorporated customary
international law and four 1958 Conventions3.

They are the Convention of Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone, the Convention of High Seas, the
Convention of Continental Shelf and the Convention of Fishing and Conservation of the Living
Resources of the High Seas.
3
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While every state has the exclusive right to sail its ships on the high seas, it has several
obligations to exercise its jurisdiction and control over the ships according to Article 94 of
UNCLOS. More specifically, flag states should take relevant measures on ship registration,
securing a ship’s safety at sea including the survey and crew qualifications and marine
casualty investigation in respect of administrative, technical and social matters concerning
the ships. Furthermore, Article 211(2) and Article 217 of the Convention requires that flag
states should ensure their vessels to comply with applicable international rules and
standards on enactment, survey, certification and control over violation in respect to the
prevention of pollution of the marine environment.
On the other hand, a port state is given the power to establish particular requirements to
prevent and control marine pollution from foreign vessels calling their ports under Article
211(3) of UNCLOS. Additionally, Article 218 and 219 of UNCLOS describe the right of port
states to investigate or inspect foreign vessels called their ports to protect marine
environment. While Article 219 states administrative measures to prevent environmental
threats that may be caused by violation of international standards on a ship’s
seaworthiness, Article 218 defines the jurisdiction of port states in respect of an illegal
discharge from a vessel.
The legal grounds in Anti Fouling Convention
Most ships have been applying anti-fouling coating of paints to the hull to prevent or
reduce attached organisms by slowly leeching the compounds of paint or killing barnacles
and other marine lives. However, the paints may contain harmful substances for the marine
eco system (IMO, n.d.c). For the purpose of regulating ecologically harmful substances in
anti-fouling system, the International Convention on the Control of Harmful Anti-fouling
Systems on Ships (AFS) was adopted in 2001.
Even though the AFS convention became effective on 17 September 2008, the
application, re-application or use of harmful anti-fouling systems to all ships has been
prohibited since 1 January 2003 and ships do not bear such compounds on their hull or
external surface since 1 January 2008 according to Article 4 and Annex 1 of the Convention.
The Convention requires ships of 400 gross tonnages and above, engaged in international
voyages, to hold an International Anti-fouling System Certificate issued by ship’s flag state4.

If a ship of 24 meters or more in length, but less than 400 gross tonnages, is engaged in
international voyages, the ship should carry a Declaration signed by the owner or owner authorized
agent according to Regulation 5 of Annex 4 of the Convention.
4
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Port states can inspect a ship calling in their ports whether the ship complies to the
Convention or not by Article 11 of the Convention. If non-compliance is suspected, port
states can take a brief sample from the ship’s anti-fouling system.
The legal grounds in ILO No. 147 Convention
The ILO, a specialized agency of the United Nations founded in 1919 to seek promotion
of social justice in respect of human and labour rights, adopted its first maritime
Conventions in 19205. Since the first official discussion in ILO in 1933, the ILO No. 147
Convention was the result of a long discussion in ILO (Kasoulides, 1993).
The ILO No. 147 Convention, which was incorporated in the MLC, was adopted in 1976
and came into force in 1981. The Convention consists of 12 Articles and one Appendix,
without detailed technical requirements, which is a list of other ILO Conventions that have
the same effect to be ratified simultaneously when that Convention is ratified by member
states. Therefore, the ILO No. 147 Convention, so called “umbrella convention”, covers in
respect of seafarers’ working conditions including hours of work, manning, officers’
competency and safety standards to prevent accident, social security measures and
shipboard conditions of employment and living arrangements.
Though Article 4 of the Convention provides the grounds on the right of a port state’s
intervention, the approach of its inspection is interpreted more narrowly compared to the
regulations of other IMO Conventions. This Article states that the port state may conduct an
inspection when receiving a complaint or obtaining evidence that the ship does not conform
to the requirements of this Convention. This means that the inspection under the
Convention is deemed “passive” while IMO Conventions such as SOLAS and MARPOL are
more active to conduct PSC inspections with respect to port states.

2.2

No more favorable treatment clause

A treaty or international convention is adopted by a signature or expressed agreement of
consent of each government to have that effect after negotiations. According to paragraph
3 of Article 24 under the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 1969, by establishing
the consent of a State to be bound on specific date after the treaty has come into force, the
treaty enters into force for that State on that date unless the treaty otherwise provides.
Additionally, every treaty in force is binding upon the parties to it according to Article 26 of
the Convention. These clauses explain the general principles of international laws that the

Minimum Age (Sea) Convention (No. 7), Unemployment Indemnity Shipwreck Convention (No. 8)
and Placing of Seaman Convention (No. 9).
5
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states under their free will consent to the treaty to observe the obligations required by it
become the parties to that treaty and that, unless provided otherwise, non-parties are not
bound to it generally. For instance, PSC under the SOLAS 19146 applied not to all ships
called in the ports of contracting party, but ships flagged in the contracting governments
(Ozcayir, 2004). Other examples can be found in certain ILO maritime conventions, i.e.
Article 6.1 of the ILO No. 147 Convention and Article 18.1 of the ILO No. 180 Convention
clearly describe that “this Convention shall be binding only upon those Members of the
Organization whose ratifications have been registered”.
On the contrary to the above principle, the ICLL Convention introduced “no more
favorable treatment” (NMFT) clause in 1930. The clause might apply to similar levels of
convention rules to ships, regardless of being non-party to the Convention of a ship’s flag
state, and provide the same playing level of competition by preventing them from enjoying
any premium of ships registered in the non-parties to a Convention. Article 17 of the
Convention describes that “the privileges of this Convention may not be claimed in favour of
any ship unless it holds a valid International Load Line Certificate”. Furthermore, the Article
22 of ICLL 1966 and Regulation 20 of Chapter I of SOLAS 1974 have nearly the same
wording as that Article.
It is also indicative that paragraph 4 of Article 5 of MARPOL Convention, 1973, clearly
states that “with respect to the ships of non-Parties to the Convention, Parties shall apply
the requirements of the present Convention as may be necessary to ensure that NMFT is
given to such ships”. Additionally, the NMFT clause gradually incorporates to paragraph 5
of Article X of STCW 1978, Article II(3) of Protocol 1978 and Article I(3) of Protocol 1988 of
SOLAS 1974 and paragraph 1.5 of IMO Resolution A.787(19), which describes procedures
for PSC adopted in 1995 (IMO, 2001). Hence, port States have clear legal grounds for
inspecting all ships including vessels flagged in non-party to the Conventions.
These clauses of NMFT offer a justification for PSC by providing a remedy to solve a
drawback for applying the regulations of Conventions to the ships of non-Contracting
parties, which are generally not applied to these Conventions. Furthermore, the clauses
have accelerated flag states to ratify a Convention by removing the advantages of nonParties to that Convention. For instance, it accounts over 99 percent of world gross tonnage
for the ships of members have ratified the main Conventions of PSC under the auspices of
IMO such as ICLL 1966, Annex I and II of MARPOL 1973/1978, SOLAS 1974 and STCW
1978 (IMO, 2017).
Article 61 of the Convention described that every ship of contracting State is subject in the ports of
other contracting States to control by authorized officers. This intent of the Article was succeeded by
next versions of SOLAS and even SOLAS 1974, which stipulates that every ship when in a port of
another Contracting Government is subject to the control of officers duly authorized.
6
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2.3

Development of regional PSC cooperation arrangements

Paris MoU
The Paris MoU succeeding the Hague MOU mentioned previously in section 1.1, was
initially signed by 14 States in January 1982 and was effective from July 1982 (Ozcayir,
2004; Paris MoU, 2016a). Its members have extended to 27 States as of 2016, including
European Union countries, Norway, Iceland, Russia and Canada.
The MOU itself is a kind of “gentleman’s agreement”, not creating any legal obligations to
its members. However, the European Commission adopted the EC Directive 95/21/EC,
which imposes obligations on its member states of the European Union to inspect at least
annually 25 percent of individual ships calling at their ports from July 1996 (Ozcayir, 2004).
Furthermore, innovative measures were introduced when the 24 year-old oil tanker Erica
and the 25 year-old oil tanker Prestige accidents in December 1999 and November 2002
respectively, caused serious environmental pollution along the Atlantic coast of west
Europe.
In January 2002, the European Commission adopted Directive 2001/105/EC and
Directive 2001/106/EC, which are amendments to Directive 95/21/EC. The Directives, in
respect of short term legislative measures, the so called Erica Package I, proposed several
measures and became effective on 22 July 2003 (European Union, 2007a). The measures
included banning the access of multi-detained vessels7 to its ports and dictating the
conduct of more stringent inspection for old-age ships and supervising classification
societies with more stringent quality criteria.
A long-term package of legislative measures, the Erica Package II, was also adopted by
the Commission (European Union, 2007b). A vessel monitoring and information system8
was established by the Directive 2002/59/EC to reduce the risk of accidents in geographic
chokepoints such as the English Channel and the Strait of Gibraltar. Vessels bound for EU
ports are required to report to port authorities 24 hours before arrival. Additionally a
compensation fund, named COPE, and the European Maritime Safety Agency9 is
established (European Union, 2015a).

It is denied to enter the ports of the Union for ships older than fifteen years that have been detained
by PSC more than twice within the two preceding years
7

8

It is named to “SafeSeaNet” operated by the European Maritime Safety Agency (EMSA)

EMSA was established by EC Regulation No 1406/2002, which took into force 27 June 2002, to
“ensure a high, uniform and effective level of maritime safety, maritime security and prevention and
response to pollution caused by ships or by oil and gas installations”
9
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To improve the existing legislative measures on maritime safety, the European
Commission adopted in March 2009, the so-called Erica Package III, which became
effective on 17 June 2009 (European Commission, 2017; GARD, 2010). The Directive
2009/21/EC requires EU member states to ensure the quality of safety standards of their
ships and not register them in the black or grey lists of the Paris MoU. The Directive
2009/16/EC aims to increase the effectiveness of the existing PSC scheme; it describes
that all vessels calling on EU ports should be inspected based on a risk profile and that a
blacklist of companies operating substandard ships as well as flag states is published.
These “Erica Packages” of the European Commission were incorporated into the Paris
MoU accordingly, which gives the effect of strengthening the port states’ power to control
foreign vessels (Ozcayir, 2004). Thus, the MoU is supplemented and transformed into a
“half legal entity” by its EU member States that have vigorous enforcement powers to deny
the entry of foreign vessels with multiple detentions according to Section 4 of the MoU10.
The instruments of the Paris MoU according to its paragraph 2.1 are 12 Conventions
with their Protocols including SOLAS 1974, MARPOL 1973/1978, STCW 1978, ILO No. 147,
MLC and the International Convention for Control and Management of Ship’s Ballast Water
and Sediments (BWM), 2004, which entered into force on the 8 September 2017. The
interesting instruments of the MoU are the International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil
Pollution Damage (CLC 1969) including the 1992 Protocol and International Convention on
Civil Liability for Bunker Oil Pollution Damage (Bunker Convention) (Paris MoU, 2016b).
These two Conventions that were incorporated by the Directive 2001/106/EC and Directive
2013/38/EC respectively are not listed in the applicable conventions according to the
“Procedures for PSC”, IMO A.27/Res.1052, adopted in 2011. It is deemed that no clear
clause provides the right of sanctions of port states against foreign vessels in the
Conventions while contracting port states are given obligations, through paragraph 11 of
Article 7 of the CLC and paragraph 12 of Article 7 of the Bunker Convention, to check the
validity of insurances or other relevant security items of these ships as required by those
Conventions (European Union, 2015b).
The Paris MoU publishes the PSC performance of flag states, whose vessels have been
more than 30 inspections over a 3-year rolling period, based on the detention rate
calculated by its specific formula (Paris MoU, 2016c). A State having a low risk to be
detained is categorized in the “White list” while a State with high risk is registered in “Black
For instance, if a ship of a flag state in the Grey List of the MoU’s annual report was detained twice
in the course of the preceding 24 months, the ship should be prohibited to enter the EU ports for 3
months. If a ship flying a flag in the Black List is detained twice within 36 months, the ship is under the
same sanction. The sanction for multiple detentions gradually increases for 12 months, 24 months
and permanence against the second, third and fourth refusal orders respectively
10
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list”. If the State is between two groups it comes into the “Grey list”. The ships flagged into
the Black list are at a disadvantage of being more frequently inspected than other ships in
the Grey and White list. Additionally the MoU releases the performance of each RO having
a minimum of 60 inspections over a 3-year rolling period with the same formula to calculate
that of the flag states (Paris MoU, 2016d).

Tokyo MOU
The Tokyo MOU was signed in December 1993 and has been effective since April 1994
for the purpose of “an improved and harmonized system of PSC and of strengthening
cooperation and the exchange of information” (Tokyo MOU, 2016a). The MOU was
established under impetus from the IMO Res. A.682(17) adopted in 1991, which the
organization invites States to consider concluding and participating in the regional PSC
MOU.
The Tokyo MOU, as a non-binding entity, has not any enforcement power and provides a
guideline for the general commitment inspection of its 20 full member authorities11. Hence,
each authority voluntarily determines its national inspection target for individual foreign
vessels while the Committee of the MOU monitors the overall inspection activity of the
member authorities to achieve the regional inspection rate of 80% of the total number of
ships operating in the region according to paragraph 1.4 of the MOU.
The instruments of the MOU include SOLAS, MARPOL, STCW, ICLL, ILO No. 147
Convention, MLC, BWM and CLC 1969; it is very similar to the Paris MoU, except the
Bunker Convention. This MOU stipulates that an authority do not impose excessive
standards on foreign vessels rather than those applicable to its national flagged ships when
applying the regulations of the relevant instruments for PSC.
The Tokyo MOU annually publishes its Black, Grey and White lists based on the flag
state’s performance. Its evaluation formula is similar to that of the Paris MoU. Additionally,
Under-performing ship list is published to increase pressures on substandard shipowners.
The member authorities are requested to inspect the ships in the list, which have been
detained for three or more times in the region during the last 12 months. As of May 2017,
there are 11 vessels in the list (Tokyo MOU, 2017a).
The MOU carries out its Concentrated Inspection Campaign (CIC), normally for three
months, on specific areas to prevent accidents related to emerging issues or to check
shipping industry’s preparedness on new regulations. The MOU has been conducted its

Australia, Canada, Chile, China, Fiji, Hong Kong(China), Indonesia, Japan, Republic of Korea,
Malaysia, the Republic of the Marshall Islands, New Zealand, Papua New Guinea, Peru, the
Philippines, the Russian Federation, Singapore, Thailand, Vanuatu and Viet Nam
11

15

CIC on fire safety system, propulsion and auxiliary machinery, STCW hours of rest, crew
familiarization for enclosed space entry and cargo securing arrangement from 2012 to 2016
(Tokyo MOU, 2016b). The most of its CICs have been conducted with Paris MoU for a
decade. Especially the CIC in 2015 was carried out by five other PSC regional cooperation
schemes including the Latin American Agreement, the Indian Ocean Memorandum of
Understanding (IOMoU), the Mediterranean Memorandum of Understanding (MedMoU),
and the Black Sea Memorandum of Understanding (BSMoU). The next CIC will jointly be
carried out with the Paris MoU on the Safety of Navigation including ECDIS and the
MARPOL Annex VI in 2017 and 2018 respectively.
Other PSC MOUs
Spurred by the Paris MoU and IMO Res. A.682(17), the Latin American Agreement was
signed on 5 November 1992. Its membership is termed as Members, Co-operating
Members and Observers, as similar to the Tokyo MOU (Latin American Agreement, 2017).
As of May 2017, its full membership is 15 authorities12.
The instruments of the Agreement include numerous IMO Conventions as stated in IMO
Resolution A.1052(27). However, the ILO No. 147 and MLC Conventions are not included,
whereas, the CLC 1969 is. The minimum inspection target of each member authority of the
Agreement is 20 percent of the calling foreign vessels during the last 6 months according to
paragraph 1.3 of the Agreement.
Following the establishment of the Tokyo MOU in 1994, Caribbean MOU, MedMoU,
IOMoU, Abuja MOU and BSMoU were signed in 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999 and 2000
respectively. The latest regional cooperation scheme on PSC among the nine MOUs is the
Riyadh MOU signed in 2004. Although their instruments are nearly similar with the ones of
the Tokyo MOU, the Riyadh MOU excludes the ILO No. 147, MLC and CLC 1969
Conventions.
The annual inspection target is set to 15 percent of the ships calling at each member
authority of the Caribbean, Mediterranean, Abuja and Riyadh MOU while the Indian Ocean
MOU agrees each authority inspects 10 percent of all visiting foreign ships. The BSMoU
has a similar target to the Tokyo MOU to inspect 75 percent of those visiting in the region
annually. The regional MOUs, except the Abuja MOU, have been conducted their CIC
inspection for specific areas (IMO Secretariat, 2016).
The inspection data, including detailed detentions, are released through each MOU’s
public website for transparency. The detention rate varied from 0.48 percent of the Abuja
Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Cuba, Ecuador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Panama,
Peru, Dominican Republic, Uruguay and Venezuela.
12
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MOU to 6.26 percent of the IOMOU in 2014. The detention rate of the Paris MoU was 3.32
percent in 2014; the Tokyo MOU one was 3.96 percent. For imposing more pressure on
substandard vessels, the IOMoU, Abuja MOU and BSMoU have published underperforming
ship list similar to the Tokyo MOU.
PSC activity of the USCG
The introduction of ship inspection in the United States ports took place in 1838; the
inspection program has been reinforced via several stages since then with the ratification of
the ILO No. 147 Convention in June 1988 (Boisson, 1999). On May 1 1994, by the request
of the U.S. Congress, the USCG has changed its PSC policy to concentrate its control on
substandard ships based on the performance of their owners, charterers, ROs and flag
states (Ozcayir, 2004). The instruments of its inspections are mainly IMO Conventions and
the ILO No. 147 Convention.
Its inspection priority is basically provided by the boarding matrix that is calculated based
on the weighing points of an individual vessel for five parameters of ship management
(owner, operator or charterer), flag state , RO, vessel history (inspection, marine casualty
and marine violation) and ship particulars (type and age). The Priority I ships are those
having a higher total targeting score, which is the sum of weighing points for each
parameter, or involved marine casualty or whose RO has more than two percent or greater
than the average detention ratio. These ships are targeted for inspection before entering
U.S. ports and may be restricted from port entry (USCG 2017). Vessels having a medium
targeting score, or with outstanding requirements from a previous inspection, or has not
been inspected within the last 12 months, are categorized as Priority II, which is targeted to
examine before cargo operations or passenger embarkation/disembarkation while NonPriority vessels with low safety and environment risks may randomly be selected for
inspection.
The USCG publishes the annual “Targeted Flag list”, which has a higher detention ratio
than the three-year overall average of the USCG. There are 15 states in the list based on
the performance of 2013-2015 (USCG, 2016a). The authority also releases the lists of
targeted ship managements and charterers that have been associated with two or more
safety detentions within the past twelve months. Additionally, a ship that has been detained
three times within a twelve month period must be conducted as an expanded inspection of
ISM for determining the banning of entry into U.S. ports (USCG, 2010). There are three
vessels in the banning list since the application of the measure took place in 2010 (USCG,
2016b).
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MARITIME LABOUR CONVENTION (MLC)

3.1

The background and characteristics of the MLC

Since adopting the first convention on seafarers’ labour rights in 1920, the ILO has
adopted around 41 Conventions for the shipping industry. However, dozens of the
Conventions have not been effective due to a limited number of ratifications by member
states of the Organization, while some of the Conventions have been ratified by a large
number enough to enter into force. Another inconvenience of the Conventions compared to
the IMO Conventions is that the scope of each Convention deals with a too specific narrow
area and that hence many conventions exist to cover the seafarers’ labour rights. For
instance, the ILO No. 16 Convention deals with the medical examination of young persons
and the ILO No. 58 Convention covers the minimum age of seafarers with only 12 Articles.
Another problem in respect to secure seafarers’ right is the lack of enforcement power to
implement the requirements of the ILO’s Conventions. As shipping is the most
internationalized industry, flag states having the jurisdiction of control on their ships are not
effective to ensure their ships to maintain seafarers’ onboard working condition because of
ship’s mobility and less calling their home port.
Since initiating discussion to improve seafarers’ labour lights in the late of 1990s, the
Joint Maritime Commission launched a project in 2000 that is called “Geneva Accord” to
collect all relevant ILO instruments and merge them into one single convention. The next
year, considering unique tripartite system of the Organization consisting of representatives of
workers, employers and governments, a High Level Tripartite Working Group was created to
deal the issues of the Geneva Accord. The working group prepared the draft of the MLC for
the Diplomatic Conference in 2006 following several important meetings to reach the goal
(Durler, 2010).
The MLC was adopted by the majority of the members of the attendants to the
Conference in 2006. The Convention not having a Convention number, unlikely to other ILO
Conventions, consolidated 68 international conventions and recommendations on maritime
labour issues under the auspices of ILO instruments (Abel, 2014; Durler, 2010; ILO, 2017a).
The Convention covers seafarers’ living and working conditions, including employment,
welfare, food and prevention of occupational accidents on board (Mejia, 2016)
The Convention consists of Articles, Regulations and a two-part Code, where Part A
provides binding standards while Part B is dealing with non-compulsory Guidelines. The 16
Articles of the Convention prescribe general obligations, including the implementation and
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enforcement of member states, scope of application, fundamental rights of seafarers, entry
into force and procedures of amendments. Its Regulations and Code are organized into five
Titles13. Each Title contains the groups of provisions with connected numbering, which
consist of hierarchical composition of relevant Regulation, Part A and Part B of the Code.
Following the Articles of the Convention, there is an Explanatory Note to the Regulation and
Code which is intended as a general guide to understand the legal relationship among the
Regulation, Part A and Part B of the Code but do not form of the Convention (ILO, 2009).
The Note is a “new figure” in respect to the physical format of convention structure, which is
extremely rare in the existing IMO and ILO maritime Conventions (McConnell, Devlin, &
Doumbia-Henry, 2011).
The MLC became effective on August 20, 2013 after 12 months from the date of
ratifications by at least 30 states, whose total share accounts for more than 33 percent of
world total gross tonnage of merchant fleet (Article VIII). Among existing 41 ILO maritime
Conventions, 37 legal instruments including one Protocol are revised by the Article X of the
Convention14 (International Labour Office, 2015). This Article has another effect: the
countries that do not ratify the MLC will remain bound by the existing Conventions that they
have ratified, although those instruments will be closed to further ratification. For instance,
the state ratified both ILO No. 147 Convention and MLC leads the effect to automatically
denounce from former convention. Out of 56 states that ratified the ILO No. 147 Convention,
15 states of non-party to the MLC including the United States and Brazil, as of May 2017,
still maintain the status of contracting government to the Convention (ILO, 2017b)
Another characteristic of MLC in terms of contents is allowing the flexibility of the national
level in its implementation. There are two main areas of flexibility as stated in the
Explanatory note of the Convention: one is the possibility for a member to recognize
substantial equivalence having the same effect to the Standards of the Convention as
defined in paragraph 3 and 4 of Article VI and the other is empowering a wider scope of
national discretion through the compulsory Standards of the Convention. The former, like
the Regulation 5 of Chapter I of SOLAS 1974 and Regulation 5 of MARPOL Annex I for
accepting an alternative fitting, materials and design to adapt new technology or specific
surroundings, should have at least the effect as those required by the relevant Regulation
Title 1: ”Minimum requirements for seafarers to work on a ship”, Title 2: “Conditions of
employment”, Title 3: “Accommodation, recreational facilities, food and catering”, Title 4: “Health
protection, medical care, welfare and social security protection” and Title 5: “Compliance and
enforcement”.
13

Four conventions were excluded; the ILO No. 15 Convention on minimum age (trimmers and
stokers), ILO No. 71 Convention on seafarers’ pensions, and ILO No. 108 and 185 Conventions on
seafarers’ identity documents.
14
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and clearly be recorded in Part I of the Declaration of the maritime labour compliance
(DMLC) according to paragraph 10 of Standard A5.1.3. While the latter grants flexibility for
each flag state, it seems to cause an adverse effect of hampering the universality of unified
regulations.
The other powerful development is enhancing implementation by certification and PSC
including NMFT on the ships of non-party to the Convention. Certification to ships imposes
responsibility on the flag state to implement the requirements of the Convention while PSC
acts as supplementing flag states as well as monitoring their performance.
On the other hand, each contracting government is asked to submit its annual reports on
how to implement ratified Conventions to International Labour Office according to Article 22
of the Constitution of the ILO. Thus, member authorities of the MLC make the report that is
given their new legislative measures affecting the application of the Convention, replies to
the questions in the form on the practical application and replies to comments regarding the
application of the Convention by the supervisory bodies (ILO, 2010). The information
provided by each contracting government would be reviewed by supervisory bodies and,
where necessary, is made comments that give the effect for ILO to evaluate the
performance quality of flag state as like acting function of “white list” by the STCW
mentioned in 2.1.5.
3.2

Application of the MLC

The MLC basically applies to all seafarers who are employed or engaged in any capacity
on board a ship to which this Convention applies (Article II.2). If there is a question as to
whether certain categories of persons are to be regarded as seafarers, the flag state would
determine it after consultation with the shipowners’ and seafarers’ organizations (Article
II.3).
Considering the traditional concept that a master is an allegiant agent for the owners in
commercial matters, as well as a representative of the ship and an administrator for ship’s
crew in public aspect, masters had not been regarded as a seafarer by other Conventions
and especially shipowners’ party (Cartner, 2014). According to the definition of the
Convention, a ship’s master is also defined as a seafarer (Cartner, 2014; Durler, 2010).
Hence, a master has the rights of enjoying decent working and living conditions as a
seafarer in personal entity while he or she, in respect of public view, has the duties to
familiar with following regulations of the Convention and to secure their implementation
(Standard A5.1.3.7(c))15.
record-keeping of seafarers’ employment document on board, recording hours of rest, ensuring
repatriation, maintaining safe manning level, preserving decent accommodation and recreation
15
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The Convention applies to all ships, ordinarily engaged in commercial activities, other
than fishing boats, warships, naval auxiliaries and traditional ships such as dhows and
junks (Article II.4). However, the Convention does not apply to ships that navigate
exclusively in inland waters or waters within, or closely adjacent to, sheltered waters or
areas where port regulations apply by the definition of ship (Article II.1(i)). Flag states
determine whether a specific category of ships applies to this Convention or not (Article II.5).
Any determination by flag stats as to whether a specific person on board or ships apply
to this Convention and application of grace period for certain rules to domestic ships of less
than 200 gross tonnage shall be communicated to the Director-General of International
Labour Office, who notify them to the member states (Article II.7). For instance, by the
determination of the Republic of Korea according to the Article, the followings are not
regarded as a seafarer: technicians and workers temporarily joining a ship for the purpose
of repairing the ship; harbour pilots, workers working for ships only operating in harbor area;
trainees and cadets (ILO, 2016).
While most IMO Conventions apply new rules to a ship if the ship is under the category
of a major conversion or alteration for a specific regulation, the MLC does not apply such a
definition. This means Regulation 3.1.2 of the MLC that relates to ship construction and
equipment applies to ships constructed on or after the twentieth August 2013, regardless of
a ship’s conversion date. This is also clearly stated in paragraph 2.2 of the Tokyo MOU.
3.3

PSC under the MLC

Unlike other ILO maritime Conventions, the MLC gives clear legal grounds of the port
states’ right to exercise active PSC inspections on foreign vessels calling at their ports
(Article V.4 and Regulation 5.2). The regulations are deemed not to impose obligation to port
states while the flag states have an obvious obligation to control their ships under paragraph
7 of Article V. This means PSC, as a general obligation of the contracting government, is a
discretionary power to protect its national interests and to secure the goals of the relevant
Conventions (Kasoulidies, 1993).
The MLC clearly describes the NMFT clause in paragraph 7 of Article V that the
Convention applies to the ships flagged in non-ratifying states. Thus, the port state that has
ratified the MLC, as the same as most of IMO Conventions, may inspect foreign ships in its
ports regardless of their nationality in order to set a level playing ground.

facilities and catering, taking measures accident prevention, posting inspection reports by flag stats
and establishing on-board complaint procedures.
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On the other hand, MLC has a unique procedure for seafarers to report a breach of the
Convention to the competent authority when they visit a harbor for the prompt and practical
measure of remediation according to Regulation 5.2.2. The port authority receiving seafarer
complaints should undertake relevant investigations, which is the obligation of the port state.
The scope of the investigation by receiving a complaint is not limited to one of the 14 areas
listed in Appendix A5-III of the Convention according to paragraph 79 of the Guidelines for
port state control officers under the MLC, 2006 (PSC Guideline) adopted by the tripartite
expert’s meeting in 2008. If the complaint is not resolved at the ship-board level, it should be
notified to the flag state or where necessary to the Director-General of the International
Labour Office. Before reporting to the port administration, seafarers may directly raise the
issue to the ship’s committee or master of the ship or lodge to the external authorities
(Standard A5.1.5). The on-board complaint procedures should be provided to include the
right of seafarers to be accompanied or represented during the procedure and safeguard
against the possibility of seafarer’s victimization for filing complaints. The paragraph 7 of the
Standard describes that safeguard measures on the confidentiality of the complaints should
be taken.
3.4

Challenges of conducting PSC in relation to MLC

The instruments of PSC are normally based on “applicable international standards”,
which mean international conventions, rather than national requirements. When conducting
a PSC, the port authority is requested to exercise its power without discrimination against
foreign vessels voluntarily calling at its ports according to Article 227 of UNCLOS. As a more
specific example, paragraph 2.6 of the Tokyo MOU describes that the port authority will not
impose standards on foreign vessels that are in excess of the standard applicable to ships
flying the flag of that port state. In addition, the port authority exercises its power within
reasonable expectation because excessive measures by the authority may cause retaliatory
measures by its counterparts (Kasoulides, 1993).
Although the Convention does not describe specific requirements, there are simple ideas
on the policy of inspection and enforcement activities and on the professional profile and
requirements of the authorized officers by port states in paragraph 7 of Standard A.5.2.1 and
paragraph 33~38 of the PSC Guideline. The officers should carry out the PSC inspection in
a consistent manner based mostly on international standards and be reluctant to apply their
national requirements that go beyond the standards.
On the other hand, many Standards to grant national discretion in the MLC are explained
in 3.1 as shown in Table 1. One of the reasons allowing wide national discretions can be
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explained by the facts that there are 8 Conventions16 out of 37 Conventions consolidated by
the MLC, as shown in Table 2, have not been effective. Even the other effective Conventions
had been ratified only by less than half of the shipping states or dominant flag states at the
time of MLC adoption. The largest number of ratifications among them is 82 States for the
ILO No. 16 Convention while most of the other ILO Conventions have recorded less than 50
contracting governments. It is arguable whether the Conventions ratified only by these small
numbers of states could be recognized as “generally accepted international regulations” or
“applicable international rules and standards” by Article 94 and Article 219 of UNCLOS.
Another reason is that it is necessary to get a result in the agreement of the majority of
states for the adoption and early entry into force of the MLC, considering that the 30 states
and 33 percent requirements of the MLC to entry into force are more strict than other ILO
conventions, i.e. that of ILO No. 147 Convention is 10 members and 25 percent (McConnell,
Devlin, & Doumbia-Henry, 2011). Furthermore, Title 5 on implementation of flag and port
states with NMFT clause, as a new context in ILO Conventions, makes States cautious
when considering their ratification.
Among two flexibilities in MLC, substantial equivalence should clearly be recorded in
Part I of the DMLC defined in paragraph 10 of Standard A5.1.3, thus PSC officers could
easily identify it and assume its scope of variation from the Standards. While national
discretion seems to be more complicated for the officers since, although concise national
regulations are provided in the DMLC, there is no clear reference for deciding whether it is
relevant or not. To define its relevance, the officers should be accustomed to each flag
states’ regulations or communicate with the relevant maritime administrations when
suspecting. Hence, it is deemed difficult to fill these conditions considering that no officers
are clued up to each member’s national rules. Additionally, getting feedback from the flag
state in a timely manner is very restricted by the time officers to review the national and
conventional rules and judge what actions are appropriate to reach the goal of the
Convention without causing the unduly delay of a ship’s operation. Especially, certain types
of vessels including containerships, car carriers and cruiser ships stay only for a few hours in
a harbor, which is not providing adequate time for the officers to communicate other
administrations to confirm their rules. These constraints may result in a reluctance to inspect
foreign ships actively for the regulations granting national flexibility.

Holidays with Pay (No.54), Social Security (No. 70), Paid Vacations (No. 72), Wages, Hours of
Work and Manning (No. 57, 93 and 109), Accommodation of Crews Convention, 1946 (No. 75) and
Wages, Hours of Work and Manning (Sea) Convention, 1946 (No. 76)
16
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Hypothesis and methodology

4.1

Hypothesis

In the aspect of PSC that should be conducted on the basis of international standards,
the flexibility of a Flag state should not be desirable and may act as a negative influence
due to the lack of the knowledge and source of PSC officers for a Flag state’s specific rules.
It can be expected that such flexibility results in excluding or inactively exercising PSC
inspection for specific areas.
On the other hand, the various areas of the MLC are not fully covered by the ILO No.
147 Convention, which was the only instrument to conduct PSC inspection among the ILO
Conventions before the adoption of the MLC (Ozcayir, 2004; Paris MoU, 2016b; Tokyo
MOU, 2016a). Therefore, the PSC inspection results between before and after three years
of the effectuation of the Convention would be different because the Parties to the MLC and
the ILO No. 147 Convention and their coverages are not the same as each other. However,
if we compare the same nature of the deficiency, we can access the change between two
periods. From the analysis, the paper can evaluate how the MLC acts for the decent
working and living conditions of seafarers and identify non-compliance areas, which show
the categories of ships that are vulnerable to the Convention.
Therefore, this paper, based on these assumptions, will explore the hypothesis that;
① the flexibility of Flag states’ discretion under the MLC takes an adverse effect to Port
state enforcements;
② PSC inspection data can be used as an indicator to show the weak areas of
implementing the MLC, which can compare the PSC outcomes of the IMO
conventions to the MLC;
③ there is a significant change in the statistics between the ILO No. 147 Convention,
which had been conducted before the entry into force of the MLC, and the MLC;
and
④ the PSC results on the MLC between Paris MoU and Tokyo MOU are not the same,
which reflects their regional circumstance.
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4.2

Dataset

To demonstrate the hypothesis mentioned in 4.1, the data of the Paris MoU and Tokyo
MOU are used as shown in Table 3. The reason is that both MOUs are recognized as the
most active and well-organized ones among nine regional PSC cooperation schemes, as
explained in 2.3. However, 88,812 deficiency records in this Table are not the same as the
number in their Annual Reports (Paris MoU, 2013, 2017a; Tokyo MOU, 2017b). This might
be a result of the re-arrangement of their deficiency coding system for the implementation of
the MLC.
Both MOUs developed similar coding systems in order to process data concisely and
precisely for ship type, flag state, RO, port authority, port of inspection, certificates,
deficiency group and nature of deficiency. The Deficiency codes of both MOUs have the
same structure and nearly same codes for deficiencies as shown in Table 4. However, a few
deficiencies are not exactly the same to each other (Paris MoU, 2017b; Tokyo MOU, 2017c).
For example, the Tokyo MOU has 13 sub-codes under the ISM deficiency group while the
Paris MoU has only one sub-code.
The codes of deficiency group for the ILO No. 147 Convention by both MOUs are 091
and 092 and that of MLC are 181, 182, 183 and 184, which is the same arrangement to each
Title of the Conventions. The codes of deficiency groups for both Conventions have several
sub-codes as shown in Tables 5 and 6.
The system also includes the certificates related to the MLC, such as Medical certificate
(deficiency Code 1218), Training and qualification by MLC for personal safety training (1219)
and Seafarers’ employment agreement (1220) that are categorized into the deficiency group
of “Certificate and Documentation – Crew Certificate”.
4.3

Methodology

This research has examined the regulations of the MLC by authorizing national
discretion through the interpretative approach and will carry out an analysis for the PSC data
of both MOUs. The data will be analyzed by the correlation among ship’s age, type, size,
nature of deficiencies and detentions for two periods of three years before and after 2013 in
two regional MOUs.
The paper will identify the difficulties in carrying out PSC inspection with the flexibility of
national discretion, the trend of deficiencies and detentions pointed out by both MoUs for two
ILO Conventions and the weak parts of the MLC in terms of PSC inspection. The discussion
will then be followed by the outcome of the analysis.
Therefore, this paper will
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review and study some pre-literature and methodologies related to the background
of the PSC and the MLC;



examine the reluctance and difficulties to exercise PSC inspection in the MLC
regulations including Flag states’ discretion clauses;



analyze the PSC inspection data of the Paris MoU and Tokyo MOU of before and
after three years of MLC implementation ;



attempt to interpret the dataset and discuss the implication of analysis and identify
the statistical trend therefrom; and



suggest to lessen the burden of PSC officers dealing the Flag states’ discretion
clauses in the MLC and to correspond the weak areas be dealt for further
improvements.
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DATA ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION

5.1

Overview of the PSC results

The total PSC inspections conducted by the Paris MoU have decreased from 24,058
inspections in 2010 to 17,828 inspections in 2016. Those of the Tokyo MOU have increased
from 25,762 inspections to 31,678 inspections during the period as shown in Table 7. While
total number of deficiencies and detentions had been reduced in both MOUs, the detention
rate of the Paris MoU has maintained an uprising trend from 3.28 percent in 2010 to 3.79
percent.
While the deficiencies of the Paris MoU for the MLC including the ILO No. 147
Convention have decreased from 9,989 in 2010 to 6,730 in 2016, those of the Tokyo MOU
have increased from 2,990 in 2010 to 6,622 in 2016. The number of detentions related to the
MLC in the Paris MoU during the six years was 8,607 and its average detention rate to the
deficiencies was 19.30 percent. On the other hand, the number of detentions in the Tokyo
MOU during the period was 6,046 with a 19.04 percent of its average detention rate. The
detention rate in the Paris MoU for both Conventions has been going up from 16.87 percent
in 2010 to 22.21 percent in 2016 while that of the Tokyo MOU has gone down from 27.79
percent to 14.56 percent during the period.
For the deficiencies related to the MLC, both MOUs had the same trends of increasing
more than 20.7 percent annually during the three years. The deficiency areas for Title 1
accounted for only 1.6 percent to the whole MLC deficiencies in two MOUs while the
deficiencies for Title 4 overwhelmed other areas with more than 51.5 percent.
5.2

Statistics of the PSC inspection of the Paris MoU

Analysis of the deficiencies of the Paris MoU
The most frequently identified deficiency related to both Conventions in the Paris MoU
during the six years was the cleanliness of engine room (deficiency code 9232) as shown in
Figure 1. The second was sanitary facilities (9106 and 18302) followed by electrical (9209)
and ropes/wires (9227), which are the deficiency group of working conditions. The next
deficiency was personal equipment (18412) and wages (18203). The highest detention rate
among major deficiencies in the MoU was code 18203 with 52.0 percent followed by
provisions quantity (18314 and 9128), code 18302 and ventilation for accommodation (9103).
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Figure 1 Major detentions in the Paris MoU

For the relationship of ship type-age compared between 2010-2012 and 2014-2016, the
number of deficiencies for General cargo ships was decreasing in all ages except for 5-10
and 15-20 years intervals as shown in Figure 2. The number of deficiencies for the type,
which was the largest one with 20,423 deficiencies (44.8 percent) among a total of 45,579
deficiencies during the period, peaked at the age interval of 25-35 years. The second largest
type was Bulk carriers with 9,212 deficiencies (20.2 percent) that were increasing up to 20
years after implementing the MLC compared to those of before 2013. The Most deficiencies
were for Containerships with 3,154 deficiencies in the range of 5-20 years. Chemical tankers
had the trend of increasing deficiencies for the range of 5-15 years after 2013. RO-RO cargo
ships having a 3.50 percent share fluctuated in ages and peaked their deficiencies at the
interval of 30-35 years. The Refrigerated cargo carrier of the ranges of 15-30 years had a
higher portion of deficiencies while 5-15 years-old Oil tankers had many deficiencies for the
type. Additionally, the distribution of deficiencies by nine age groups fluctuated from 5.7
percent for 40 years and above to 14.8 percent for 25-30 years.
The analysis for the other ship types are excluded in this study since those are not
seemed as major ones. Also the limitation of this study’s wording is considered.
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Figure 2 The deficiencies of the Paris MoU by ship type-age
The deficiencies of General cargo ships for the six intervals of relationship between ship
type and gross tonnage were decreasing after 2013 compared to before 2013 as shown in
Figure 3. The interval of 2,000-5,000 tons of the type peaked with 5,826 deficiencies during
2010-2012 and 4,834 deficiencies after 2013. Bulk carrier’s deficiencies were concentrated
in the range of 5,000-50,000 tons and the interval of 20,000-50,000 tons increased and
peaked with 2,709 deficiencies after 2013. Containerships had the most deficiencies for
5,000 tons and above and peaked at the interval of 5,000-20,000 tons with 699 deficiencies
before 2013.
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Chemical tanker’s deficiencies positioned in the range of 2,000-50,000 tons and had no
significant changes before and after 2013. Oil tankers were increasing deficiencies in the
range of 20,000 and above after 2013. Refrigerated cargo carriers’ deficiencies peaked at
829 in the interval of 5,000-20,000 tons before 2013 and fell to 332 after 2013.
The deficiencies of less than 500 gross tons and less than 5 years were 8.6 percent of
the total deficiencies among nine intervals of ship ages and increased at the interval of 40
years and above from 77 to 233 after 2013 as shown in Figure 4. The deficiencies of 5002,000 tons after 2013 had a smaller number than those of before 2013 and hit a high point of
873 at the interval of 25-30 years. Similarly, 2,000-5,000 tons’ deficiencies took a higher
portion in the range of 25-35 years. 5,000-20,000 tons’ deficiencies peaked with 1,466 after
2013 at the interval of 5-10 years and jumped from 804 before 2013. The deficiencies of
20000-50,000 tons increased after 2013 compared to those of before 2013 up to 20 years
and had small portions after 30 years. The deficiencies of 50,000 tons and over marked less
than 317 with reducing to less than 77 in the range of 20 years and above.
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Figure 4 The deficiencies of the Paris MoU by gross tonnage-age

The greatest deficiencies for General cargo ships was the deficiency code 9106 in Table
6 followed by medical equipment (code 9112), cold room temperature (9132), code 9128
and cleanliness for living conditions (9127) as shown in Figure 5. Bulk carriers had a similar
trend except for positioning code 1220 in fifth place. The major deficiencies of
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Containerships, Chemical tankers, Oil tankers and Refrigerated cargo carriers were similar
to those of Bulk carriers.
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Figure 5 The deficiencies of the Paris MoU by ship type-deficiency code

Ships of less than five years old had high frequent deficiency codes of 9209, 9112, and
9298 while the highest deficiency for the group of 5-10 years was code 18408 followed by
the codes of 9232, 9209, 18324 (cold room, cold room cleanliness, cold room temperature)
and 9298 as shown in Figure 6. The highest deficiency codes for the group of 10-15 years
were the codes of 9232, 9209, 9298, 18408 and 18425 (access / structural features), which
was nearly the same trend with the other groups.
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Analysis of the detentions of Paris MoU
The number of detentions for General cargo ships was generally increasing as a ship’s
age gets higher and the interval of 5-10 years and 15-20 years increased in the number of
detentions after 2013, compared to those of before 2013 as shown in Figure 7. The number
of detentions for this type was the largest with 4,840 detentions (56.2 percent) among a total
of 8,607 detentions during the period, peaking at 548 at the age interval of 30-35 years
before 2013. The second largest type was Bulk carriers with 1,572 detentions (18.3 percent),
which was increasing after 2013, compared to those of before 2013 except for the interval of
25-30 years. 10-20 year old Containerships were more vulnerable to be detained and the
intervals of 5-10 years and 20-25 years had more detentions after 2013 than before 2013.
Interestingly, RO-RO cargo ships were the fourth largest group with 325 detentions peaking
at the interval of 25-30 years. Chemical tankers had the trend of increasing detentions for
the range of 5-15 years after 2013, while the age groups of 25-30 years and 30-35 years
accounted for more than 17.0 percent of the total detentions respectively, the group of less
than five years taking 4.2 percent. Oil tankers recorded only 155 detentions during 6 years.
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Figure 7 The detentions of the Paris MoU by ship type-age

About 51.7 percent of the detentions for General cargo ships were marked at the interval
of 2,000-5,000 gross tonnage. Detentions of the groups of 2,000-5,000 and 5,000-20,000
tons rose after 2013 compared to before 2013 as shown in Figure 8. About 95.8 percent of
the detentions for Bulk carriers were concentrated in the range of 5,000-50,000 tons, which
were increasing after 2013, compared to those of before 2013. The range of 5,000-50,000
tons of Containers accounted for 86.5 percent of their detentions. The intervals of 5,000-
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20,000 and 50,000 tons and above for the type were increasing after 2013 compared to
those of before 2013. The range of 5,000-50,000 tons of RO-RO cargo ships accounted for
74.5 percent of their detentions and the detentions of the range increased after 2013,
compared to before 2013. The group of 2,000-5,000 tons of Chemical tankers shared 41.4
percent of detentions for the type and the 5,000-20,000 tons’ interval increased after 2013,
compared to those of before 2013.
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Figure 8 The detentions of the Paris MoU by ship type-gross tonnage

The detentions of less than 500 gross tons accounted for only 3.3 percent of the total
detentions of six groups and the interval of 40 years and above took 46.5 percent of the
group’s detention as shown in Figure 9. The detentions of the 500-2,000 ton group
concentrated with 85.7 percent in the range of 25 years and above. The 2,000-5,000 ton
group had the highest detention with 34.1 percent, accounting for 65.3 percent in the group
for the age of 25 and above. The 5,000-20,000 ton detentions peaked at the age of 15-20
and were increasing in seven intervals, except the intervals of less than five years and 25-30
years after 2013, compared to those of before 2013. The detentions of the 20,000-50,000
ton group were increasing after 2013 compared to those of before 2013 up to 20 years and
accounted for 32.7 percent in the group for the age of 25 and above. The detentions of
50,000 tons and over, which were the lowest among the groups, accounted for only 1.6
percent. The range of 10-20 years shared 62.6 percent for the group’s detention and were
increasing after 2013 compared to those of before 2013.
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Figure 9 The detentions of the Paris MoU by gross tonnage-age
The greatest detention item for General cargo ships was deficiency code 9232 with 332
detentions followed by the codes of 9106, 9209, 9227 and 18412 as shown in Figure 10. The
major deficiency codes of Bulk carrier detentions were 9232, 9106, 18302, 9209 and 9298.
Those of Containerships were 9232, 9209, 9298, 9203 (Lighting for working spaces) and
18420 (Cleanliness of engine room) while the codes of 9232, 18424, 9106, 9207 and 9112
were for Chemical tankers. RO-RO cargo ships were mainly detained by the deficiency
codes of 9232, 18408, 9298, 9209 and 18420.
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5.3

Statistics of the PSC inspection of the Tokyo MOU

Analysis of the deficiencies of the Tokyo MOU
The most notable deficiency in the Tokyo MOU was records of rest (deficiency code
1308) followed by code 9232, gangway/accommodation ladder (9223) and others for
accident prevention (9298) as shown in Figure 11. The top 15 deficiencies in the MOU were
under the deficiency group of working conditions, except code 1308, schedules for
watchkeeping personnel (1306) and seafarers’ employment agreement (1220). The next
coming deficiencies were electrical (code 18408), manning specified by the minimum safe
manning (1209) and ropes/ wires (18416). The highest detention rate among major
deficiencies in the MOU was code 1209 with 37.0 percent followed by code 18203, other for
working space (9297) and code 18314.
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Figure 11 Major detentions in Tokyo MOU

The largest ship type having deficiencies related to the MLC and ILO No. 147
Conventions in the Tokyo MOU during six years was General cargo ships that accounted for
36.5 percent (15,786) of the total of 43,233 deficiencies as shown in Figure 12. The type’s
deficiencies peaked at the interval of 5-10 years after 2013 and the range of 5-30 years was
rising after 2013, compared to those of pre-implementing the MLC. Bulk carriers with 29.9
percent of total deficiencies peaked their deficiencies at the same interval of General cargo
ships and declined as a ship’s age was getting older. The type had bigger deficiencies in the
range of less than 25 years after 2013 than before 2013. Containerships, Chemical tankers
and Oil tankers with 12.0, 5.4 and 5.0 percent of total deficiencies respectively had a similar
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trend to Bulk carriers. For the distribution of deficiencies by nine age groups, the highest
group was 5-10 years with 22.7 percent and a range of less than 30 years accounting for 90
percent of total deficiencies.
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Figure 12 The deficiencies of the Tokyo MOU by ship type-age

96.0 percent of the deficiencies of General cargo ships positioned in three intervals of
500-20,000 tons among six intervals of gross tonnage and the type’s deficiencies were
increasing until 50,000 tons after 2013 compared to those of before 2013 as shown in Figure
13. Bulk carrier’s deficiencies were concentrated at the interval of 20,000-50,000 tons and
increased for more than 500 tons after 2013, compared to those of before 2013.
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Figure 13 The deficiencies of the Tokyo MOU by ship type-gross tonnage
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Containerships had the most deficiencies for 5,000 tons and above and their deficiencies
were rising at the range of 500 tons and above after 2013, which was a similar trend to
Chemical tankers and Oil tankers.
93.0 percent of deficiencies were concentrated in the range of less than 30 years. The
deficiencies of less than 5 years peaked at the interval of 20,000-50,000 tons and were
increasing at the intervals of less than 500 tons and 20,000 tons and above as shown in
Figure 14. The deficiencies of the 5-10 year group were the largest with 22.7 percent among
nine groups of ages, which peaked at the interval of 5,000-20,000 tons and were increasing
at all the intervals after 2013. The deficiencies of 10-15 years peaked at the interval of
20,000-50,000 tons and were increasing at all intervals after 2013. The deficiencies of 15-20
years peaked at the interval of 5,000- 20,000 tons and were decreasing only at the intervals
of 500-2,000 tons after 2013. The 20-25 year deficiencies peaked at the interval of 5002,000 tons and increased until 2,000 tons, which was the same trend as the 25-30 year
deficiencies. The 30-35 year group accounted for 5.0 percent of the total deficiencies and
peaked at the interval of 5,000-20,000 tons. The deficiencies of 35 years and above
accounted for only 2.0 percent of the total deficiencies.
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Figure 14 The deficiencies of the Tokyo MOU by gross tonnage-age
The major deficiencies of General cargo ships were deficiency codes of 1308, 9232,
9223, 9227 and 1220 as shown in Figure 15. Among them, the code 1308 surged 5.95 times
from 239 deficiencies during 2010-2012 to 1,422 deficiencies during 2014-2016 while code
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9232 dropped 3.05 times from 1,021 before 2013 to 335 deficiencies after 2013. The top
three deficiencies of Bulk carriers were the same as those of General cargo ships, which
were followed by codes 18408 and 9298. The major deficiencies of Containerships were
codes 9232, 1308, 9209, 1220 and 9223. Chemical tankers had major deficiencies for codes
1308, 9219, 9298, 9211 and 9203 while Oil tankers were mainly highlighted for codes 1220,
1308, 9203, 9219 (Pipes, wires of insulation) and 9223.
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Figure 15 The deficiencies of the Tokyo MOU by ship type-deficiency code
Analysis of the detentions of the Tokyo MOU
The number of detentions for General cargo ships accounted for 42.0 percent of total
detentions in the MOU and was fluctuating but generally increasing until 30 years as a ship’s
age got older as shown in Figure 16. The range of 5-20 years had larger detentions during
2014-2016 than during 2010-2012. The second largest type was Bulk carriers with 1,768
detentions (29.2 percent), which was increasing until 20 years old. The detentions of the
type were distributed evenly over the range of 0-30 years. 74.3 percent of Containership
detentions were concentrated in the range of 5-20 years. Chemical tankers having 3.8
percent of the total detentions had fewer detentions, except for the interval of 5-10 years,
after 2013 than before 2013 while Oil tankers had a greater figure up to 25 years after 2013.
Refrigerated cargo ships and RO-RO cargo ships shared their deficiencies with 2.99 and
2.15 percent of total deficiencies and 3.18 and 1.90 percent of total detentions respectively.

38

400
350

Bulk

300
250

Chem

200
150

Cont

100
50

Gen

under 5

5-10

10-15

15-20

20-25

25-30

30-35

post

before

post

before

post

before

post

before

post

before

post

before

post

before

post

before

post

before

0

35-40 0ver 40

Oil
ROROC

Figure 16 The detentions of the Tokyo MOU by ship type-age

About 40.2 percent of the detentions for General cargo ships were recorded at the
interval of 2,000-5,000 gross tonnage as shown in Figure 17. The type’s detentions were
rising up to 5,000 tons after 2013 compared to before 2013. The detentions for Bulk carriers
were increasing after 2013 compared to those of before 2013 and were concentrated in the
range of 5,000-50,000 tons with 78.5 percent. The detentions of Containers were not
significantly changed before and after 2013 and their range of 5,000-50,000 tons accounted
for 69.0 percent of their detentions. The interval of 2,000-5,000 tons of Chemical tankers
shared 44.8 percent of their detentions that were generally decreasing after 2013 while Oil
tankers generally showed an even spread over the tonnages and increased after 2013.
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Figure 17 The detentions of the Tokyo MOU by ship type-gross tonnage
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Each group of less than 30 year old ships shared from 11.6 to 18.8 percent of detentions
as shown in Figure 18. The detentions of less than five years was increasing at the intervals
of less than 500 gross tons and 20000 tons and above after 2013. The 5-10 year detentions
were increasing over the tonnage intervals after 2013 and peaked at the interval of 2005,000 tons. The 10-15 year detentions peaked at the interval of 20,000-50,000 tons and the
change before and after 2013 fluctuated over the tonnages. The 15-20 year detentions
peaked at the interval of 5,000-20,000 tons and increased in the range of 2,000-50,000 tons
after 2013. The detentions of 20-25 and 25-30 years peaked at the interval of 500-2,000 tons
and generally decreased after 2013. The 30-35 year detentions peaked 5,000-20,000 tons
and were increasing until 5,000 tons after 2013. The detentions of 35 years and above
accounted for 2.2 percent of the total detentions and occurred less than 50,000 tons.
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Figure 18 The detentions of the Tokyo MOU by gross tonnage-age

The greatest detention item for General cargo ships was deficiency code 9232 with 268
detentions followed by the codes of 1308, 9223, 9203, 9229 as shown in Figure 19. These
codes, except for 1308, were decreasing detentions after 2013. The major deficiency codes
of Bulk carrier detentions were 1308, 9298, 9232, 18408 and 9223, which had the same
trend of post-period as General cargo ships. The codes of 9232, 1308, 9223, 9298 and
18408 were the main detainable items for Containers. For Chemical tanker, the major
detentions were the codes of 9219, 9298, 9211, 9204 and 9232, of which the last two codes
marked zero after 2013. Oil tankers were mainly detained by codes 1220, 9232, 1308,
18299 (other for conditions of employment) and 9219.
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Figure 19 The detentions of the Tokyo MOU by ship type-deficiency code

5.4

Discussion

For the three-years after implementation of the MLC, 15,593 deficiencies with an
average number of 205.17 for all deficiency codes in the Paris MoU and 16,546 deficiencies
with an average of 201.78 in the Tokyo MOU were identified in both ILO Conventions. For
the relation to national discretion granted by the MLC, the Paris MoU recorded in total 2,492
deficiencies with an average of 178.00 per individual deficiency codes and the Tokyo MOU
marked 4,737 deficiencies with an average of 263.17 as shown in Table 8. If the figures are
calculated by each number of deficiency codes, considering that several clauses on the
national discretions were duplicated to one deficiency code, the revised average was down
to 113.27 in the Paris MoU and 175.44 in the Tokyo MOU, which is 55.2 percent to the
average for all deficiency codes and 86.9 percent in the Tokyo MOU as mentioned in the first
hypothesis.
Although it is not easy to say that the above figures give a perfect correlation between
the lower deficiencies and PSC officers’ behavior by the drawback of the regulations in terms
of PSC, as mentioned in 3.4, it is more reasonable to believe that PSC Officers will have
difficulty in confirming flag states’ regulations within a limited time and that it will cause
passive inspection in the areas.
There were 17 deficiency codes in both of the MOUs’ top 30 detainable deficiencies17 as
shown in Figure 1 and 11. These codes could be assumed as an indicator for weaker areas
Code 9232, 9203, 1220, 9106, 9298, 9229, 9204, 9227, 9228, 9223, 18408, 18416, 18302, 18203,
9207, 18425 and 9297
17
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for ships to implement the MLC and ILO No. 147 Convention. For instance, the Paris MoU
presents its key performance indicators (KPIs) by the number of inspections, inspections
with deficiencies, deficiencies, detainable deficiencies, detentions and ISM deficiencies
(Paris MoU, 2017c).
For the accommodation and recreational facilities through Regulation 3.1 of the MLC,
each deficiency code from 18301 to 18311 was marked less than 1.03 percent of the total
deficiencies during 2014-2016, except for code 18302 having 4.41 percent in Paris MoU and
2.47 percent in Tokyo MOU both recorded above the average. The outcome seems to be
reflected by the fact that the Regulation applies to new ships constructed after August 2013,
regardless of a major conversion. This means existing ships do not apply to the regulation
even if the ship undertakes a major conversion after 2013, which is not the same approach
as IMO Conventions.
As the MLC includes ILO No. 147 Convention, most deficiencies of both the Conventions
are the same nature with a different deficiency code. For example, the deficiency code for
personal equipment is 9216 for the latter Convention while 18412 is for the former one.
Although this paper analyzes the basis of the deficiency code without incorporating the same
nature of deficiency, several codes showed significant change between the pre- and postimplementing the MLC. Generally the codes of Table 5 for ILO No. 147 Convention were
decreasing after 2013 while the ones in Table 6 for the MLC were increasing. Also the
deficiencies and detentions in the Tokyo MOU were increasing over ship ages and sizes
after 2013. Especially, the number of deficiency code 1308 for the records of rest in the
Tokyo MOU after 2013 jumped up 4.94 times and that of detention also increased 2.04 times
during the period.
After implementing the MLC, the deficiencies for the Convention were rising more than
20.7 percent annually during the three years in both MOUs. However, the number of
deficiencies and detentions for each item were not the same. The deficiencies in the Paris
MoU during 2010-2012 accounted for 54.8 percent, which was greater than 45.2 percent for
2014-2016, while the Tokyo MOU had a larger figure of 63.2 percent after 2013 than before
2013. This means the number of deficiencies in the Tokyo MOU after 2013 increased by
71.84 percent compared to before 2013. While the detention of both MOUs for the postimplementation of the MLC recorded larger numbers with 51.5 and 54.7 percent respectively
than before 2013. Even though the number of Paris MoU’s deficiencies in the areas
decreased, increasing detentions of both MOUs shows that they had placed stricter
enforcement on seafarers’ living and working environments after implementing the MLC.
Especially, code 18203 (wages) recorded 52.0 percent of the highest detention rates to
deficiencies in Paris MoU and the second with 31.0 percent in the Tokyo MOU.
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It is also noted that the deficiencies and detentions related to the MLC rather than ILO
No. 147 Convention were increasing after 2013 compared to those of before 2013. For
instance, the detentions in the Tokyo MOU decreased for the deficiency codes of 9232, 9298,
9299 (Other for mooring), 9223, 9227, 9228 (Anchoring devices), 9229 (Winches/capstans)
and 9203 after 2013 while the codes of 1308, 1220 and new deficiency groups for the MLC
were increasing after 2013. From other analyses on ship type, tonnage and age in 5.2 and
5.3, different outcomes of deficiencies and detentions were presented. For example, the
deficiency and detention rates of General cargo ships were 44.8 and 56.2 percent in the
Paris MoU while they marked 36.5 and 40.2 percent in the Tokyo MOU respectively. Another
example is that the largest ship types in the Tokyo MOU were General cargo ships, Bulk
carriers, Containerships, Chemical tankers and Oil tankers in order while RO-RO cargo
ships were positioned in the fourth for the highest detention types and the fifth for the highest
deficiencies in the Paris MoU. Meanwhile, RO-RO cargo ships in the Tokyo MOU ranked the
seventh largest ship types having their share of 2.15 percent of deficiencies and 1.90
percent of the total detentions.
One of the reasons of having the above differences between two regions can be
explained by the number of the contracting governments to the MLC and ILO No. 147
Convention. As shown in Table 9, all 27 member authorities of the Paris MoU are contracting
governments to the latter Convention and its 26 authorities are ones to the MLC while,
among 20 full member authorities of the Tokyo MOU, only five and 14 members are
contracting governments to the ILO No. 147 and the MLC respectively. Another reason is
assumed that the characteristics of calling vessels in the region were diverse as its main
trading commodities are different from each MOU
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CONCLUSION

The aims of this paper were to examine the difference of legal grounds for PSC among
the Conventions under the auspices of the IMO and ILO and investigate what influenced the
MLC towards the shipping industry. This dissertation has focused on finding out the weak
areas of seafarers’ living and working environments of the MLC and ILO No. 147 Convention
related to the PSC data conducted by the Paris MoU and the Tokyo MOU during 2010-2012
and 2014-2016, which were the periods before and after three-years of the year of entering
into force of the MLC.
This study describes the background of the IMO and ILO Conventions, the legal grounds
of PSC and the development of PSC regional cooperation schemes. The brief background of
adopting the MLC, its main figures, implementing PSC and shortcomings in terms of
conducting PSC were also provided. Additionally, the analysis on the correlation among
ship’s type, age, gross tonnage, nature of deficiency and detention was conducted for
88,812 deficiency records of both MOUs on seafarers’ living and working conditions during
six years.
The study explains that most ILO Conventions, even though they are evaluated to
contributing to increase the level of seafarers’ labor conditions, had not greatly impacted on
the shipping industry as much as IMO Conventions. Since the Conventions, unlikely IMO
Conventions, do not provide any legal grounds of PSC with NMFT in order to control foreign
vessels for their implementation. Even the ILO No. 147 Convention, when compared to IMO
Conventions, is considered to conduct “passive” PSC inspection that could inspect when
receiving seafarers’ complaints or obtaining evidence. However, to overcome the limitation
of the ILO Conventions and achieve decent seafarer labor conditions, the MLC was adopted
with borrowing complementary articles from the IMO Conventions that were evaluated as an
“innovational measure” in respect to the ILO Conventions.
Meanwhile, the flexibility granting national discretion by the MLC could lead PSC officers
to inspect reluctantly, because PSC officers have some limitations to obtain the information
of each national regulation within their inspection time. From the analysis, the deficiency
codes related to national discretions also show lower figures than the average deficiencies of
post-implementing the MLC, as shown in Table 8.
The analysis compared the data of both MOUs by the relationship with ship type, age,
gross tonnage, deficiency and detention for the three years, which could be a good indicator
for implementing the MLC by the shipping industry like the KPIs of the Paris MoU. The study
reveals that the deficiencies of the Tokyo MOU increased by 71.8 percent in the three years
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of 2014-2016, compared to those of before 2013, while the ones of the Paris MoU were
slightly decreasing during the same periods. However, the number of detentions on the
issues was increasing in both MOUs. This implies that the shipping industry operating in the
Tokyo MOU region was much more affected by the MLC rather than that of Paris MoU.
Unlikely most IMO Conventions, ship construction in the case of having been major
conversion has not been affected by the MLC. As mentioned in 3.2, even if an existing ship
undertakes major conversions after 2013, the requirements of the MLC do not apply to the
ship according to Regulation 3.1 on the construction of accommodation facilities by the MLC.
While most member authorities of the Paris MoU were contracting governments to both
Conventions, the Tokyo MOU members were changed from 5 for the ILO No. 147
Convention to 14 for the MLC. This difference with trading commodities in both regions could
affect the PSC outcome of both MOUs. Its typical example is that the number of deficiencies
in the Tokyo MOU during 2014-2016 increased by 71.84 percent compared to 2010-2012.
The number of detentions during 2014-2016 was also rising from 4,177 to 4,430 in the Paris
MoU and from 2,736 to 3,310 in the Tokyo MOU. Another example of the difference in both
regions is different trend and share for ship’s type. General cargo ships, the largest ship type
in both regions, marked 44.8 percent of deficiencies and 56.2 percent of detentions in the
Paris MoU, which were higher by 8.3 and 16.0 percent than those of the Tokyo MOU.
Additionally, RO-RO cargo ships ranked fourth for the highest detentions type and fifth for
the highest deficiencies in the Paris MoU while it positioned only seventh in the Tokyo MOU.
Similar examples can be found in other areas of correlation among ship’s age, size, nature
of deficiency and detention.
The MLC incorporating the ILO No. 147 Convention has four deficiency coding groups,
two of which are similar deficiency codes. During 2014-2016, the number of the deficiencies
for the ILO No. 147 Convention was decreasing while that of the MLC was increasing.
Especially, the deficiency code 1308 on the records of seafarers’ rest ranked top with 8.05
percent of total deficiencies and with 11.15 percent of detentions during 2014-2016.
From the results of the analysis, it could reach a conclusion that the MLC supported by
the “police power” of PSC would bring positive effects to the improvement of seafarers’ living
and working conditions, which will consequently contribute to the safety of the ship. However,
the author believes that certain improvements/clarifications to get a better outcome from the
MLC are needed. The first suggestion is that more clear guidelines or interpretations for the
regulations allowing national discretions should be given to PSC officers, as the IMO
presents unified interpretations for vague expressions in its Conventions. Excessive national
discretion seems a kind of shortcoming of the Convention in terms of conducting PSC,
because PSC is conducted on the basis of international standards, not national rules.
Furthermore, there could be a negative impact on the fair competition among shipping
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companies and flag states by allowing setting lower standards than generally internationally
accepted ones.
Another suggestion is that the deficiency codes on several Regulations should be
developed. The Regulations 2.4, 2.5, 2.6 and 4.5 of the MLC on seafarer’s leave,
repatriation, compensation for ship’s loss or foundering and social security are not listed in
the Coding system of both MOUs. Even though these Regulations seem to apply to
seafarers getting off a ship, port states might tank a chance to investigate these issues by
the onshore seafarer complaint procedure according to Regulation 5.2.2 of the Convention.
This study was limited to examine the impact of the MLC by using the analysis of PSC
data of both MOUs considering the time pressure and data availability. The analysis was
only carried out through a broad approach on several factors such as ship type, age and size.
Hence, it is worthy to undertake further studies on how the MLC affects seafarers’ real life
through the survey considering the Convention could play a vital role in preventing maritime
accident by upgrading seafarers’ living and working conditions.
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APPENDICES (Tables)

Table 1 National discretion clauses in MLC
MLC
Standards

Requirement / Content

A1.1.2
A1.1.4
A1.4.3(c)
A1.4.6
A2.1.3
A2.1.4
A2.1.6
A2.2.5
A2.3.4
A2.3.7
A2.3.10(b)
A2.4.1
A2.4.2
A2.5.3
A2.5.4
A2.6.2
A3.1.1
A4.1.1(d)
A4.1.4(a)
A4.1.4(b)
A4.1.4(c)
A4.2.1(b)
A4.2.2
A4.2.3
A4.2.4

Definition of Night
Type of prohibited work
National Reg. to authorize collective bargaining agreement
Licences for private service operation in recruitment
The form (content) of Seafarer employment document
The contents of Seafarer employment agreement
Shortening notice period for termination of employment
Charge for transmitting wages
Hours of work and rest
Musters and drills exempted from hours of rest
Poster on hours of work and rest
Annual leave standards
Annual leave length
Recovering the cost of repatriation
Shipowner’s right to recover the cost of repatriation
Seafarer compensation for ship ‘s loss
Minimum standards for accommodation
Medical care and health protection service
Medical chest, medical equipment and guide
Medical doctor for international passengerships
Personnel for medical first aid
Financial security for occupation injury
Limiting shipowner’s liability for medical care
Paying wages during sickness or injury in work
Limiting shipowner’s liability for incapable seafarer
Excluding shipowner’s liability for willful misconduct of sick,
A4.2.5
injured or deceased seafarer
exempting shipowner’s liability covered by other public
A4.2.6
authority
R4.3.3 and Standards for occupational safety and health protection and
A4.3
accident prevention
A4.5.1
Comprehensive social security protection
A4.5.3
Complementary social security protection
A5.1.2.3(a) Oversight system for RO
A5.1.3.1
Inspection items for maritime labour certificate
A5.1.3.2
Validity of maritime labour certificate
A5.1.3.10 Declaration of maritime labour compliance
A5.1.3.11 Record of deficiencies during inspection
A5.1.3.12 Copy of MLC and DMLC
A5.1.4.16 Compensation for unreasonable detain
A5.1.5.1
On-board complaint procedures
(Source: compiled by author)
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Deficiency
Code
1139
1140
1140
for authority
1220
1329
1330
18102
18104
18199
18199
18201
18201
18202
18205
18299
18299
18299
18299
18299
18299
18399
18401
18404
18404
18406
18427
18499
for authority
for authority
for authority
for authority
for authority
for authority
for authority
for authority
for authority
for authority

Table 2 The ratification status of the consolidated conventions to MLC
Conventions
Minimum Age (Sea) Convention, 1920 (No. 7)
Unemployment Indemnity (Shipwreck) Convention, 1920 (No. 8)
Placing of Seamen Convention, 1920 (No. 9)
Medical Examination of Young Persons (Sea) Convention, 1921
(No. 16)
Seamen's Articles of Agreement Convention, 1926 (No. 22)
Repatriation of Seamen Convention, 1926 (No. 23)
Officers' Competency Certificates Convention, 1936 (No. 53)
Holidays with Pay (Sea) Convention, 1936 (No. 54)
Shipowners' Liability (Sick and Injured Seamen) Convention,
1936 (No. 55)
Sickness Insurance (Sea) Convention, 1936 (No. 56)
Hours of Work and Manning (Sea) Convention, 1936 (No. 57)
Minimum Age (Sea) Convention (Revised), 1936 (No. 58)
Food and Catering (Ships' Crews) Convention, 1946 (No. 68)
Certification of Ships' Cooks Convention, 1946 (No. 69)
Social Security (Seafarers) Convention, 1946 (No. 70)
Paid Vacations (Seafarers) Convention, 1946 (No. 72)
Medical Examination (Seafarers) Convention, 1946 (No. 73)
Certification of Able Seamen Convention, 1946 (No. 74)
Accommodation of Crews Convention, 1946 (No. 75)
Wages, Hours of Work and Manning (Sea) Convention, 1946
(No. 76)
Paid Vacations (Seafarers) Convention (Revised), 1949 (No. 91)
Accommodation of Crews Convention (Revised), 1949 (No. 92)
Wages, Hours of Work and Manning (Sea) Convention
(Revised), 1949 (No. 93)
Wages, Hours of Work and Manning (Sea) Convention
(Revised), 1958 (No. 109)
Accommodation of Crews (Supplementary Provisions)
Convention, 1970 (No. 133)
Prevention of Accidents (Seafarers) Convention, 1970 (No. 134)
Continuity of Employment (Seafarers) Convention, 1976 (No.
145)
Seafarers' Annual Leave with Pay Convention, 1976 (No. 146)
Merchant Shipping (Minimum Standards) Convention, 1976 (No.
147)
Protocol of 1996 to the Merchant Shipping (Minimum Standards)
Convention, 1976 (No. 147)
Seafarers' Welfare Convention, 1987 (No. 163)
Health Protection and Medical Care (Seafarers) Convention,
1987 (No. 164)
Social Security (Seafarers) Convention (Revised), 1987 (No.
165)
Repatriation of Seafarers Convention (Revised), 1987 (No. 166)
Labour Inspection (Seafarers) Convention, 1996 (No. 178)
Recruitment and Placement of Seafarers Convention, 1996 (No.
179)
Seafarers' Hours of Work and the Manning of Ships Convention,
1996 (No. 180)

Date of entry No. of
Effective
ratification ratification.
into force
Sep.27 1921
53
2
Mar.16 1923
60
2
Nov.23 1921
41
2
Nov.20 1922
82
2
Apr.4 1928
Apr.18 1928
Mar.29 1939
Oct.29 1939

60
47
37
6
18

2
2
2
5
2

Dec.9 1949
Apr.11 1949
Mar.24 1957
Apr.22 1953
Aug.17 1955
Jul.14 1951
-

20
3
51
25
38
7
5
46
29
5
0

2
5
2
9
9
7
9
7
2
7
9

Sep.14 1967
Jan.29 1953
-

25
47
5

9
7
9

-

15

9

Aug.27 1991

32

12

Feb.17 1973
Mar.3 1979

29
17

2
2

Jun.13 1979
Nov.28 1981

17
56

2
10

Jul.10 2003

24

5

Jan.11 1991
Jan.11 1991

15
15

2
2

Jul.2 1992

3

2

Jul.3. 1991
Apr.22 2000
Apr.22 2000

14
15
10

2
2
2

Aug.2002

21

5

(Source: compiled by the author by using the NORMLEX of ILO web site)
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Table 3 The trend of deficiencies on ILO No. 147 and MLC by both MOUs per year18
Year
Paris MoU
Tokyo MOU
Total

2010
10,271
4,676
14,947

2011
7,470
5,405
12,875

2012
7,240
5,823
13,063

2014
7,234
10,140
17,374

2015
6,634
8,520
15,154

2016
6,730
8,669
15,399

Total
45,579
43,233
88,812

Table 4 Deficiency code group of the Paris MoU and Tokyo MOU
Paris MoU
011
012
013
021
031
041
051
061
071
081
091
092
101
111
121
131
141
142
143
144
145
146
147
15
16
181
182
183

Detective item
Certificate and Documentation - Ship Certificates
Certificate and Documentation - Crew Certificates
Certificate and Documentation – Documents
Structural Conditions
Water/Weathertight conditions
Emergency Systems
Radio Communications
Cargo operations including equipment
Fire safety
Alarms
Living and Working Conditions - Living Conditions
Living and Working Conditions - Working Conditions
Safety of Navigation
Lifesaving appliances
Dangerous goods
Propulsion and auxiliary machinery
Pollution prevention - MARPOL Annex I
Pollution prevention - MARPOL Annex II
Pollution prevention - MARPOL Annex III
Pollution prevention - MARPOL Annex IV
Pollution prevention - MARPOL Annex V
Pollution prevention - MARPOL Annex VI
Pollution prevention - Anti Fouling
ISM
ISPS
Labour Conditions-Minimum requirements for seafarers
Labour Conditions-Conditions of employment

Tokyo MOU
011
012
013
021
031
041
051
061
071
081
091
092
101
111
121
131
141
142
143
144
145
146
147
15
16
181
182

Labour Conditions-Accommodation, recreational facilities, food
183
and catering
Labour Conditions-Health protection, medical care, social security 184

184
991
Other
(Source: compiled by the author from the Coding system of both MOUs)

991

The number of deficiencies differed from that of its Annual Report. It seems the differences
between both figures are caused by amending the coding system, which led to the changing the
codes of some deficiencies.
18
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Table 5 Deficiency codes for ILO No. 147 Convention by both MOUs
091 - Living and Working Conditions - Living 092 - Living and Working Conditions Conditions
Working Conditions
09101 – Minimum age

09201 - Ventilation (Working spaces)

09102 - Dirty, parasites

09202 – Heating

09103 - Ventilation (Accommodation)

09203 - Lighting (Working spaces)

09104 – Heating

09204 - Safe means of access

09105 – Noise

09205 - Safe means of access Shore – Ship

09106 - Sanitary Facilities

09206 - Safe means of access Deck - hold/tank, etc.

09107 – Drainage

09207 - Obstruction/slipping, etc.

09108 - Lighting (Accommodation)

09208 - Protection machinery

09109 - Pipes, wires (insulation)

09209 – Electrical

09110 - Electrical devices

09210 – Machinery

09111 – Sickbay

09211 - Steam pipes and pressure pipes

09112 - Medical Equipment

09212 - Danger areas

09113 - Access/structure

09213 - Gas instruments

09114 - Sleeping room

09214 - Emergency cleaning devices

09115 – No direct openings into sleeping rooms
cargo/mach.

09216 - Personal equipment

09116 – Furnishings

09217 - Warning notices

09117 - Berth dimensions, etc.

09218 - Protection machines/parts

09118 – Clear head

09219 - Pipes, wires (insulation)

09119 - Messroom (location)

09220 - Structural features (ship)

09120 - Clothes locker

09221 - Entry dangerous spaces

09121 – Laundry

09223 - Gangway, accommodation-ladder

09122 – Record of inspection (Accommodation)

09224 - Stowage of cargo

09124 - Galley, handlingroom (maintenance)

09225 - Loading and unloading equipment

09127 – Cleanliness

09226 - Holds and tanks safety

09128 – Provisions quantity

09227 - Ropes and wires

09129 - Provisions quality

09228 - Anchoring devices

09130 - Water, pipes, tanks

09229 - Winches & capstans

09131 - Cold room

09230 - Adequate lighting - mooring arrangements

09132 - Cold room temperature

09232 - Cleanliness of engine room
09233 - Guards - fencing around dangerous
machinery parts
09234 – Night working for seafarer under the age of
18

09133 - Cold room cleanliness
09134 - Food personal hygiene
09135 - Food temperature

09235 - Fitness for duty - work and rest hours

09136 – Food segregation

09236 - Legal documentation on work and rest hours

09137 - Record of inspection

09237 – Fitness for duty – intoxication

09198 - Other (crew and accommodation)

09297 - Other (working space ILO)

09199 - Other (food)

09298 - Other (accident prevention)
09299 - Other (mooring)

(Source: compiled by the author from the Coding system of the Paris MoU and Tokyo MOU)
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Table 6 Deficiency codes for MLC by both MOUs
181 - Labour Conditions-Minimum
requirements for seafarers

184 - Labour Conditions-Health protection,
medical care, social security
18401 - Medical Equipment, medical chest,
medical guide
18402 - Access to on shore medical doctor or
dentist
18403 - Standard medical report form
18404 - Medical doctor or person in charge of
medical care
18405 - Medical advice by radio or satellite
18406 - Medical care onboard or ashore free of
charge
18407 - Lighting (Working spaces)

18101 – Minimum age
18102 – Night working
18103 - Medical fitness
18104 - Recruitment and placement service
18199 - Other (Minimum requirements)
182 - Labour Conditions-Conditions of
employment
18201 - Fitness for duty - work and rest hours
18202 - Legal documentation on work and rest
hours
18203 – Wages

18408 – Electrical
18409 - Dangerous areas

18204 - Calculation and payment of wages
18205 - Measures to ensure transmission to
seafarer's family
18299 - Other (Conditions of employment)
183 - Labour Conditions-Accommodation,
recreational facilities, food and catering
18301 - Noise, vibration and other ambient
factors
18302 - Sanitary Facilities

18410 - Gas instruments

18303 – Drainage

18416 - Ropes and wires

18304 - Lighting (Accommodation)

18417 - Anchoring devices

18305 - Hospital accommodation (Sickbay)

18418 - Winches & capstans
18419 - Adequate lighting - mooring
arrangements

18411 - Emergency cleaning devices
18412 - Personal equipment
18413 - Warning notices
18414 - Protection machines/parts
18415 - Entry dangerous spaces

18306 - Sleeping room, additional spaces
18307 - No direct openings into sleeping rooms
cargo/mach.

18420 - Cleanliness of engine room
18421 - Guards - fencing around dangerous
machinery parts
18422 – Asbestos fibers

18308 – Furnishings
18309 – Berth dimensions, etc.
18310 – Minimum headroom

18423 - Preventative information
18424 - Steam pipes, pressure pipes, wires
(insulation)
18425 - Access / structural features (ship)
18426 - Exposure to harmful levels of ambient
factors
18427 - Ship's occupational safety and health
policies and programmes
18428 - On board programme for the prevention
of occupational injuries and diseases
18429 - Procedure for inspection, reporting and
correcting unsafe conditions and for
investigating and reporting on-board

18311 - Messroom and recreational facilities
18312 - Galley, handlingroom (maintenance)
18313 – Cleanliness
18314 - Provisions quantity
18315 - Provisions quality and nutritional value
18316 - Water, pipes, tanks
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occupational accidents
18317 - Food personal hygiene

18430 - Ship’s safety committee

18318 - Food temperature

18431 - Investigation after accident
18432 - Risk evaluation, training and instruction
to seafarers
18499 - Other (Health protection, medical
care…)

18319 - Food segregation
18320 - Record of inspection (food and catering)
18321 - Heating, air conditioning and ventilation
18322 – Insulation
18323 – Office
18324 - Cold room, cold room cleanliness, cold
room temperature
18325 - Training and qualification of ship’s cook
18326 - Laundry, Adequate Locker
18327 - Ventilation (Working spaces)
18328 - Record of inspection
18399 - Other (Accommodation, recreational
facilities…)

(Source: compiled by the author from the Coding system of the Paris MoU and Tokyo MOU)
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Table 7 Overview of PSC inspections by both MOUs
2010
24,058
790

2011
19,058
688

2012
18,308
669

2014
18,430
612

2015
17,858
595

2016
17,828
675

Average

64,698

50,738

49,261

45,979

41,436

41,698

48,968

3.28

3.61

3.65

3.32

3.33

3.79

3.50

9,989

7,565

7,249

2,954

1,164

974

4,983

No. of deficiencies for
MLC 2006
Title 1
Title 2

3,951

5,002

5,756

4,903

57
324

62
393

120
542

80
420

Title 3
Title 4
No. of detentions for
MLC and ILO No. 147
Detention percentage
to deficiencies for
MLC and ILO No. 147

1,352

1,752

2,038

1,714

2,218

2,795

3,056

2,690

Paris MOU
Number of inspections
Number of detentions
Number of
deficiencies
Detention % of
inspections
No. of deficiencies for
ILO No. 147

19,257
672

1,685

1,280

1,212

1,539

1,396

1,495

1,435

16.87

16.92

16.72

22.29

22.64

22.21

19.61

Average
2010
2011
2012
2014
2015
2016
Tokyo MOU
25,762 28,627
30,929 30,405 31,407 31,678
29,801
Number of inspections
1,411
1,562
1,421
1,203
1,153
1,090
1,307
Number of detentions
No. of deficiencies
102,820 91,175 84,995 82,895
92,927 106,482
93,549
(incl. ISPS)
Detention % of
5.48
5.46
4.59
3.96
3.67
3.44
4.43
inspections
No. of deficiencies for
2,990
3,411
5,168
4,663
3,215
2,904
3,725
ILO No. 147
No. of deficiencies for
2,437
3,247
3,718
3,134
MLC 2006
74
35
38
49
Title 1
363
515
483
454
Title 2
1,017
998
1,025
1,013
Title 3
983
1,699
2,172
1,618
Title 4
No. of detentions for
831
1,015
890
1,301
1,045
964
1,008
MLC and ILO No. 147
Detention percentage
to deficiencies for
27.79
29.76
17.22
18.32
16.17
14.56
20.64
MLC and ILO No. 147
(Source: compiled by the author from the Annual Reports during 2010-2016 of the Paris

MoU and Tokyo MOU)
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Table 8 The deficiencies of both MOUs on National discretion of the MLC related to
Table 1
MLC
Standards
A1.1.2
A1.1.4

Deficiency
Code
1139
1140

A1.4.3(c)

1140

A1.4.6

for authority

A2.1.3

1220

A2.1.4

Paris MoU
No. of Def.

Paris MoU
share of Def.

Tokyo MOU
Tokyo MOU
No. of Def.
share of Def.
503
3.040
313

1.892

1326

8.014

1329

10

0.060

A2.1.6

1330

463

2.798

A2.2.5

18102

2

0.013

3

0.018

A2.3.4

18104

74

0.475

76

0.459

A2.3.7

18199

A2.3.10(b)

18199

30

0.192

40

0.242

A2.4.1

18201

A2.4.2

18201

269

1.725

302

1.825

A2.5.3

18202

191

1.225

443

2.677

A2.5.4

18205

13

0.083

4

0.024

A2.6.2

18299

A3.1.1

18299

A4.1.1(d)

18299

A4.1.4(a)

18299

248

1.590

277

1.674

A4.1.4(b)

18299

A4.1.4(c)

18299

A4.2.1(b)

18399

152

0.975

237

1.432

A4.2.2

18401

496

3.181

324

1.958

A4.2.3

18404

A4.2.4

18404

12

0.077

10

0.060

A4.2.5

18406

3

0.019

4

0.024

A4.2.6

18427

22

0.141

39

0.236

A4.3

18499

515

3.303

363

2.194

A4.5.1

for authority

A4.5.3

for authority

A5.1.2.3(a)

for authority

A5.1.3.1

for authority

A5.1.3.2

for authority

A5.1.3.10
A5.1.3.11

for authority
for authority

465

2.982

59

A5.1.3.12

for authority

A5.1.4.16

for authority

A5.1.5.1

for authority

Total for Post15,593
100.000
16,546
implementation
Post Average per all Def.
205.171
1.316
201.7805
codes
Total for Codes of national
2,492
15.982
4,737
discretion
Post Average per relevant
178.000
1.142
263.167
Def. codes19
Revised Average per
113.273
0.726
175.444
relevant Def. codes20
(Source: compiled by the author from the PSC data of both MOUs)

100.000
1.220
28.629
1.591
1.060

Average calculated by the number of individual deficiency codes related to the national discretion
of the MLC, i.e. Paris MoU is 14 individual deficiency codes and Tokyo MOU is 18.
19

Revised Average calculated by the each number of deficiency codes, i.e. Paris MoU is 22
deficiency codes and Tokyo MOU is 27.
20
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Table 9 Ratification status of member Authorities of both MOUs for ILO No. 147 and
MLC Conventions
Tokyo MOU
Authority
Australia

ILO 147

Paris MoU
MLC 2006

Authority

-

2011-12-21 Belgium
Bulgaria
1993-05-25 2010-06-15 Canada
Croatia
2015-11-12 Cyprus
2013-01-21 Denmark
Kong,
Estonia
1980-11-28
-

ILO 147

MLC 2006

1982-09-16
2003-02-24
1993-05-25
1996-07-19
1995-09-19
1980-07-28

2013-08-20
2010-04-12
2010-06-15
2010-02-12
2012-07-20
2011-06-23

Canada
Chile
China
Fiji
Hong
2004-12-01 2016-05-05
China
Indonesia
Finland
1978-10-02 2013-01-09
Japan
1983-05-31 2013-08-05 France
1978-05-02 2013-02-28
Republic
of
Germany
2014-01-09
1980-07-14 2013-08-16
Korea
Malaysia
2013-08-20 Greece
1979-09-18 2013-01-04
Marshall Islands
2007-09-25 Iceland
1999-05-11
New Zealand
2016-03-09 Ireland
1992-12-16 2014-07-21
Papua
New
Italy
1981-06-23 2013-11-19
Guinea
Peru
2004-07-06
Latvia
1998-11-12 2011-08-12
Philippines
2012-08-20 Lithuania
2006-07-14 2013-08-20
Malta
2002-01-10 2013-01-22
Netherlands
1979-01-25 2011-12-13
Norway
1979-01-24 2009-02-10
Poland
1995-06-02 2012-05-03
Portugal
1985-05-02 2016-05-12
Romania
2001-05-15 2015-11-24
Russian
Russian
1991-05-07 2012-08-20
1991-05-07 2012-08-20
Federation
Federation
Singapore
2011-06-15 Slovenia
1999-06-21 2016-04-15
Thailand
2016-06-07 Spain
1978-04-28 2010-02-04
Vanuatu
Sweden
1978-12-20 2012-06-12
Viet Nam
2013-05-08 United Kingdom 1980-11-28 2013-08-07
Panama
2009-02-06
DPR Korea
Macao, China*
Solomon Islands
Tonga
Entry into force
Entry into force
1981-11-28 2013-08-20
1981-11-28 2013-08-20
date
date
(Source: compiled by the author from the ILO’s NORMLEX website and Tokyo MOU’s 2016
Annual Report)
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